Chapter 9 – Legality
9.1 General Perspectives on Illegality
Our study now turns to the legality of the underlying bargain of a contract. The basic rule is that parties can enter a contract for any lawful purpose, and therefore courts will not enforce an illegal bargain. But why should the courts refuse to honor contracts made privately by people who presumably know what they are doing—for example, a wager on the World Series or a championship fight? Two reasons are usually given. One is that refusal to enforce such an agreement helps discourage unlawful behavior; the other is that honoring such contracts would demean the judiciary. It is unclear whether such limitations discourage parties from entering unlawful agreements. For instance, a man hired to commit a murder is not in the least deterred by the fact that the courts are not open to him to collect his fee. So, the protection of the good name of the judicial institution must provide the principal reason for denial of a remedy to one who has made an illegal bargain. Implementing this rule means that a promisee who has already performed under an illegal contract can neither obtain performance of the act for which he bargained nor recover the money he paid or the value of the performance he made. The court will simply leave the parties where it finds them, meaning that one of the parties will have received an uncompensated benefit, and the other will have no lawful remedy.
Following this notion, the courts have created several exceptions to the general rule. Not surprisingly, the severity of the rule against enforcement has led courts to seek ways to moderate its impact, chiefly by modifying it according to the principle of restitution. In general, restitution requires that one who has conferred a benefit or suffered a loss should not unfairly be denied compensation. Thus, a party who is excusably ignorant that his promise violates public policy and a party who is not equally in the wrong may recover restitution. Likewise, when a party “would otherwise suffer a forfeiture that is disproportionate in relation to the contravention of public policy involved,” restitution will be allowed. Other exceptions exist when the party seeking restitution withdraws from the transaction contemplated in the contract before the illegal purpose has been carried out and when “allowing the claim would put an end to a continuing situation that is contrary to the public interest.” An example of the latter situation occurs when two bettors place money in the hands of a stakeholder. If the wager is unlawful, the loser of the bet has the right to recover his money from the stakeholder before it is paid out to the winner.
Though by and large courts enforce contracts without considering the worth or merits of the bargain they incorporate, freedom of contract can conflict with other public policies. Tensions arise between the desire to let people pursue their own ends and the belief that certain kinds of conduct should not be encouraged. Thus, a patient may agree to be treated by an herbalist, but state laws prohibit medical care except by licensed physicians. Law and public policies against usury, gambling, obstructing justice, bribery, corrupt influence, perjury, restraint of trade, impairment of domestic relations, and fraud all significantly affect the authority and willingness of courts to enforce contracts.
In this chapter, we will consider two types of illegality: (1) that which results from a bargain that violates a statute and (2) that which the courts deem contrary to public policy, even though not expressly set forth in statutes.
strict adherence to law; the quality of being legal
extending credit at an exorbitant or illegally high interest rate
an agreement between two or more parties to wager or bet on the outcome of a future event or contest over which the bettors have no control and which typically involves chance
the state of not being legally authorized
