Chapter 9 – Legality
9.2 Agreements in Violation of Statute
Any bargain that violates the criminal law—including statutes that govern extortion, robbery, embezzlement, forgery, some gambling, licensing, and consumer credit transactions—is illegal. Thus, determining whether contracts are unlawful may seem to be an easy enough task. Clearly, whenever the statute itself explicitly forbids the making of the contract or the performance agreed upon, the bargain (such as a contract to sell drugs) is unlawful. But when the statute does not expressly prohibit the making of the contract to engage in an unlawful act, courts examine a number of factors.
It is important to remember that statutes can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and, thus, what might be unlawful conduct in one state might be lawful in another – making a contract valid in one state yet void in another.
Gambling Contracts
A gambling contract is an agreement between two or more parties to wager or bet on the outcome of a future event or contest over which the bettors have no control and which typically involves chance. These contracts are generally considered illegal due to a variety of legal and public policy concerns. Some of the concerns about these contracts include gambling addiction, financial hardship, the potential for fraud, and other social problems like potentially attracting criminal elements who are lured by the prospect of making easy money. That said, many states do have some kinds of gambling that have been legalized and regulated, including state-sponsored lotteries.
Because the outcome is contingent on events that lie outside the power of the parties to control does not transform a bargain into a gambling contract. For example, if a parent says to his daughter, “I’ll bet you can’t get an A in organic chemistry. If you do, I’ll give you $50,” this is not a gambling contract, but a unilateral contract, the consideration to the father being the daughter’s achieving a good grade.
Despite the general rule against enforcing wagers, there are exceptions, most statutory but some rooted in the common law. The common law permits the sale or purchase of securities: Sally invests $6,000 in stock in Acme Company, hoping the stock will increase in value, though she has no control over the firm’s management. It is not called gambling; it is considered respectable risk-taking in the capitalist system, or “entrepreneurialism.” Insurance contracts are also speculative, but unless one party has no insurable interest (a concern for the person or thing insured) in the insured, the contract is not considered a wager.
Activity 9A
You be the judge
Sunday Contracts
At common law, contracts entered into on Sundays, as well as other commercial activities, are valid and enforceable. However, there are some state statutes or local ordinances that regulate or restrict certain activities, including entering into contracts, on Sundays or other specific days of the week, often due to religious or historical reasons. These laws vary significantly from one jurisdiction to another, but they often address matters such as retail sales, alcohol consumption, and recreational activities.
These laws trace to the Second Commandment which frowns on work performed on “the Lord’s Day.” In 1781, a New Haven city ordinance banning Sunday work was printed on blue paper, and since that time such laws have been known as ‘blue laws.’ The first statewide blue law was enacted in the United States in 1788; it prohibited travel, work, sports and amusements, and the carrying on of any business or occupation on Sundays. The only exceptions in most states throughout most of the nineteenth century were mutual promises to marry and contracts of necessity or charity. As the Puritan fervor wore off and citizens were, more and more, importuned to consider themselves “consumers” in a capitalistic economic system, the laws have faded in importance and have mostly repealed or unenforced. That said, New Jersey still has many Blue laws within the state and in specific municipalities. For instance, in the Borough of Paramus New Jersey, local ordinance code §391-2 provides:
Sunday activities restricted.
No worldly employment or business, except works of necessity and charity, shall be performed or practiced by any person within the Borough on the first day of the week, commonly called and hereinafter designated as “Sunday.”
Thus, many businesses located in the Borough of Paramus, including the Paramus Park Mall are closed on Sundays.
Usury
A usury statute is one that sets the maximum allowable interest that may be charged on a loan; usury is charging illegal interest rates. Formerly, such statutes were a matter of real importance because the penalty levied on the lender—ranging from forfeiture of the interest, or of both the principal and the interest, or of some part of the principal—was significant. But usury laws, like Sunday contract laws, have been relaxed to accommodate an ever-more-frenzied consumer society. There are a number of transactions to which the laws do not apply, varying by state: small consumer loans, pawn shop loans, payday loans, and corporate loans. In Marquette v. First Omaha Service Corp., the Supreme Court ruled that a national bank could charge the highest interest rate allowed in its home state to customers living anywhere in the United States, including states with restrictive interest caps. Thus it was that in 1980m Citibank moved its credit card headquarters from cosmopolitan New York City to the somewhat less cosmopolitan Sioux Falls, South Dakota. South Dakota had recently abolished its usury laws, and so, as far as credit-card interest rates, the sky was the limit. That appealed to Citibank and a number of other financial institutions, and to the state of South Dakota because it became a major player in the U.S. financial industry, creating many jobs in the state.
Licensing Statutes
To practice most professions and carry on the trade of an increasing number of occupations, states require that providers of services possess licenses—hairdressers, doctors, plumbers, real estate brokers, anglers, egg inspectors, and, yes, lawyers are among those on a long list. As sometimes happens, though, a person may contract for the services of one who is unlicensed, either because (1) they are unqualified and conducting business without a license or (2) because for technical reasons (e.g., forgetting to mail in the license renewal application) they do not possess a license at the moment. To better understand the impact of a license or its lack, suppose that Robin calls Paul to provide legal services in drafting a contract. Paul, who does not have a license to practice law, drafts a contract for Robin’s purpose. Robin then discovers that Paul does not have a law license, and refuses to pay Paul for the contract. Is Paul entitled to collect the fee?
The answer to this question requires a three-step analysis. First, some occupations may be performed without a license (e.g., lawn mowing). Other occupations may be performed with or without certain credentials, the difference lying in what the professional may tell the public. For instance, an accountant need not be a certified public accountant to carry out most accounting functions. Still, some occupations require a license as a minimum requirement to perform a specific type of work. It is safe to assume that in the example above, Paul is required to hold a valid license to practice law to perform legal work for Robin.
The second step is to determine whether the licensing statute explicitly bars recovery by someone who has performed work while unlicensed. Reading the statute would be required to determine this, but many statutes do not contain a specific provision on the point. Statutes that do bar recovery would end our analysis, but let’s assume that the statute in this scenario is silent on the practice of law without a license.
When a statute is silent, the third step of the analysis is to distinguish between “regulatory” and “revenue” licenses. A regulatory license is intended to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. To obtain these licenses, the practitioner of the art must generally demonstrate his or her abilities by taking some sort of examination, like the bar exam for lawyers or the medical boards for doctors. A revenue license generally requires no such examination and is imposed for the sake of raising revenue and to ensure that practitioners register their address so they can be found if a disgruntled client wants to serve them legal papers for a lawsuit. Some revenue licenses, in addition to requiring registration, require practitioners to demonstrate that they have insurance. A license to tend bar, available to anyone 21 or older who applies and pays the required fee, would be an example of a revenue license. In our example, a lawyer’s license is a regulatory license.
If a state requires a professional license, it is necessary to determine whether the license is regulatory or revenue raising. Generally speaking, failure to hold a regulatory license bars recovery and such a contract would be void as illegal, but the absence of a revenue license does not bar recovery — the person may obtain the license and then move to recover.
Case 9.1
Venturi & Company v. Pacific Malibu Development Corp., 172 Cal.App.4th 1417 (Calif. Ct. App. 2009)
RUBIN, J.
In June 2003, plaintiff Venturi & Company LLC and defendant Pacific Malibu Development Corp. entered into a contract involving development of a high-end resort on undeveloped property on the Bahamian island of Little Exuma. Under the contract, plaintiff agreed to serve as a financial advisor and find financing for the Little Exuma project.…[P]laintiff was entitled to some payment under the contract even if plaintiff did not secure financing for the project [called a success fee].
After signing the contract, plaintiff contacted more than 60 potential sources of financing for the project.…[I]n the end, defendants did not receive financing from any source that plaintiff had identified.
Defendants terminated the contract in January 2005. Two months earlier, however, defendants had signed a [financing agreement] with the Talisker Group. Plaintiff was not involved in defendants’ negotiations with the Talisker Group.…Nevertheless, plaintiff claimed the contract’s provision for a success fee entitled plaintiff to compensation following the [agreement]. When defendants refused to pay plaintiff’s fee, plaintiff sued defendants for the fee and for the reasonable value of plaintiff’s services.
Defendants moved for summary judgment. They argued plaintiff had provided the services of a real estate broker by soliciting financing for the Little Exuma project yet did not have a broker’s license. Thus, defendants asserted…the Business and Professions Code barred plaintiff from receiving any compensation as an unlicensed broker.…Plaintiff opposed summary judgment. It argued that one of its managing principals, Jane Venturi, had a real estate sales license and was employed by a real estate broker (whom plaintiff did not identify) when defendants had signed their term sheet with the Talisker Group, the document that triggered plaintiff’s right to a fee.
The court entered summary judgment for defendants. The court found plaintiff had acted as a real estate broker when working on the Little Exuma project. The court pointed, however, to plaintiff’s lack of evidence that Jane Venturi’s unnamed broker had employed or authorized her to work on the project.…[Summary judgment was issued in favor of defendants, denying plaintiff any recovery.] This appeal followed.
The court correctly ruled plaintiff could not receive compensation for providing real estate broker services to defendants because plaintiff was not a licensed broker. (Section 11136 [broker’s license required to collect compensation for broker services].) But decisions such as Lindenstadt [Citation] establish that the court erred in denying plaintiff compensation to the extent plaintiff’s services were not those of a real estate broker. In Lindenstadt, the parties entered into 25 to 30 written agreements in which the plaintiff promised to help the defendant find businesses for possible acquisition. After the plaintiff found a number of such businesses, the defendant refused to compensate the plaintiff. The defendant cited the plaintiff’s performance of broker’s services without a license as justifying its refusal to pay. On appeal, the appellate court rejected the defendant’s sweeping contention that the plaintiff’s unlicensed services forsome business opportunities meant the plaintiff could not receive compensation for any business opportunity. Rather, the appellate court directed the trial court to examine individually each business opportunity to determine whether the plaintiff acted as an unlicensed broker for that transaction or instead provided only services for which it did not need a broker’s license.
Likewise here, the contract called for plaintiff to provide a range of services, some apparently requiring a broker’s license, others seemingly not. Moreover, and more to the point, plaintiff denied having been involved in arranging, let alone negotiating, defendants’ placement of Securities with the Talisker Group for which plaintiff claimed a “success fee” under the contract’s provision awarding it a fee even if it had no role in procuring the financing. Thus, triable issues existed involving the extent to which plaintiff provided either unlicensed broker services or, alternatively, non-broker services for which it did not need a license. (Accord: [Citation] [severability allowed partial enforcement of personal manager employment contract when license required for some, but not all, services rendered under the contract].)
[T]he contract here…envisioned plaintiff directing its efforts toward many potential sources of financing. As to some of those sources, plaintiff may have crossed the line into performing broker services. But for other sources, plaintiff may have provided only financial and marketing advice for which it did not need a broker’s license. (See, e.g. [Citation] [statute barring unlicensed contractor from receiving fees for some services did not prohibit recovery for work not within scope of licensing statute].) And finally, as to the Talisker Group, plaintiff may have provided even less assistance than financial and marketing advice, given that plaintiff denied involvement with the group. Whether plaintiff crossed the line into providing broker services is thus a triable issue of fact that we cannot resolve on summary judgment.
…Plaintiff…did not have a broker’s license, and therefore was not entitled to compensation for broker’s services. Plaintiff contends it was properly licensed because one of its managers, Jane Venturi, obtained a real estate sales license in February 2004. Thus, she, and plaintiff claims by extension itself, were licensed when defendants purportedly breached the contract by refusing to pay plaintiff months later for the Talisker Group placement. Jane Venturi’s sales license was not, however, sufficient; only a licensed broker may provide broker services. A sales license does not permit its holder to represent another unless the salesperson acts under a broker’s authority.
The judgment for defendants is vacated, and the trial court is directed to enter a new order denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment.…
Case Questions
- Why did the plaintiff think it should be entitled to full recovery under the contract, including for services rendered as a real estate broker? Why did the court deny that?
- Even if the plaintiff were not a real estate broker, why would that mean it could not recover for real estate services provided to the defendant?
- The appeals court remanded the case; what did it suggest the plaintiff should recover on retrial?
Debate the case – Illegal (or Not) Contracts
Some contracts are unlawful because a statute makes that contract unlawful. Yet, in another state, that contract might be completely legal. This inconsistency between jurisdictions creates a legal and policy issue resulting in inconsistent treatment of the same type of contract depending on what state the parties are in. Should statutes that make conduct illegal be consistent across all jurisdictions, or should jurisdictions have the autonomy to establish their own differing statutes, even when it comes to illegality? Do some research and find at least one source that informs on the advantages and disadvantages of jurisdictional consistency and illustrates at least one common situation where this inconsistency is seen. Then decide which position you agree with and why.
Check your understanding
an agreement between two or more parties to wager or bet on the outcome of a future event or contest over which the bettors have no control and which typically involves chance
contracts entered into on a Sunday and subject to Blue Laws
statutes or ordinances that forbid or regulate an activity, such as the sale of liquor on Sundays
extending credit at an exorbitant or illegally high interest rate
a license intended to protect the public health, safety, and welfare
a license that is imposed for the sake of raising revenue and to ensure that practitioners register their address so they can be served papers for a lawsuit if needed