Chapter 11 – Written Contracts

11.2 Contracts that must be Written under the Statute of Frauds

Five different areas of the Statute of Frauds appear in this section. For each statute, the general requirements are set forth, followed by exceptions to the general requirements.

Contracts Affecting an Interest in Land

Almost all contracts involving an interest in land are subject to the Statute of Frauds. For purposes of this statute, “land” is interpreted broadly to include such things as the actual land (e.g. ground and soil) and things attached to that land, such as trees or buildings. “Contracts that involve an interest in land” is also a broad description, which includes the sale, mortgage or lease of real property (including homes and buildings). This interest can also include profits from the land, the creation of easements on the land, and the establishment of other interests through restrictive covenants and agreements concerning the permissive use of the land.

While there are some exceptions to the writing requirement, such as a contract to sell crops grown on land, and short-term leases (usually for a term of one year or less), it is wise to put land-related contracts in writing when you are unsure if your land contract falls within the Statute of Frauds.

Exceptions to the Requirement to Place Contracts Affecting an Interest in Land in Writing

The past performance doctrine is one exception to the Statute of Frauds requirement for interest in land. While an oral contract to sell land is not normally binding, if the buyer has taken possession and made improvements on the property, courts will usually say the case is out of the statute, and the party claiming an oral contract can attempt to prove the existence of the oral contract.

Suppose that Seller agrees to sell a tract of land to Buyer for $100,000. There is no written agreement, but Buyer pays the purchase price to Seller and takes possession of the land. Buyer begins the process of making improvements to the land including erecting a fence. The actions of the seller, accepting the money, and the buyer, taking possession and making improvements, provide the confidence that this is not a fraudulent transaction. Courts can enforce this oral agreement using the exception of past performance.

The One-Year Rule

An agreement that cannot be performed within one year from its making must be evidenced by some writing to be enforceable. Memories of an oral contract can fade over time, and so under this one-year rule requiring a written contract, a documentation of the agreement will be available in the case of a later dispute between the contracting parties, or their representatives. The critical time frame is how long it will take to complete the contract from the time the contract is made until performance is complete. Consider the following examples. Which of these must be written? Which can be oral?

  1. Today, Bob agrees to work for Alice for a period of 13 months.
  2. Today, Bob agrees to work for Alice for a period of 7 months. His employment will begin 6 months from now, and continue for 7 months thereafter until complete.
  3. Today, Bob agrees to work for Alice for a period of 11 months.

Example 3 can be oral since this contract will certainly take less than one year. Example 1 must be written since this contract will certainly last more than one year. Example 2 must also be written. Even though the period of employment itself is only seven months, since that period does not begin until six months from now, the total length of the contract is 13 months. So, a written contract would be required to enforce the contract in Example 2.

Exceptions to the One-Year Rule

The one-year rule has been universally interpreted to mean a contract that is impossible to be fully performed within one year. Under the possibility test, if there is even the slightest chance of carrying out the agreement completely within a year, an oral contract is enforceable. For example, an oral agreement to pay a sum of money on a date 13 months from today is enforceable since it is possible that the payment could be made earlier, even tomorrow. Even for contracts where it would be unlikely to complete performance within a year, as long as it is possible to do so, the exception still applies. For example, a contract to construct a very large residential complex that would normally take around two years to complete would not need to be written under this Statute because, technically, if enough construction workers were employed, the complex could possibly be completed within a year. Unless there is a fixed term longer than a year, some courts have even found that a contract which involves the performance of a person can be oral because any person may die within the year, and therefore their contract would not fall within the statute.

Case 11.1

Iacono v. Lyons, 16 S.W.3d 92 (Texas Ct. App. 2000)

O’CONNOR, J.

Mary Iacono, the plaintiff below and appellant here, appeals from a take-nothing summary judgment rendered in favor of Carolyn Lyons, the defendant below and appellee here. We reverse and remand.

The plaintiff [Iacono] and defendant [Lyons] had been friends for almost 35 years. In late 1996, the defendant invited the plaintiff to join her on a trip to Las Vegas, Nevada. There is no dispute that the defendant paid all the expenses for the trip, including providing money for gambling.

The plaintiff contended she was invited to Las Vegas by the defendant because the defendant thought the plaintiff was lucky. Sometime before the trip, the plaintiff had a dream about winning on a Las Vegas slot machine. The plaintiff’s dream convinced her to go to Las Vegas, and she accepted the defendant’s offer to split “50-50” any gambling winnings.

In February 1997, the plaintiff and defendant went to Las Vegas. They started playing the slot machines at Caesar’s Palace. The plaintiff contends that, after losing $47, the defendant wanted to leave to see a show. The plaintiff begged the defendant to stay, and the defendant agreed on the condition that she (the defendant) put the coins into the machines because doing so took the plaintiff too long. (The plaintiff, who suffers from advanced rheumatoid arthritis, was in a wheelchair.) The plaintiff agreed, and took the defendant to a dollar slot machine that looked like the machine in her dream. The machine did not pay on the first try. The plaintiff then said, “Just one more time,” and the defendant looked at the plaintiff and said, “This one’s for you, Puddin.”

The slot machine paid $1,908,064. The defendant refused to share the winnings with the plaintiff, and denied they had an agreement to split any winnings. The defendant told Caesar’s Palace she was the sole winner and to pay her all the winnings.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contract. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that any oral agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds or was voidable for lack of consideration. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant.…

[Regarding the “consideration” argument:] The defendant asserted the agreement, if any, was voidable because there was no consideration. The defendant contended the plaintiff’s only contribution was the plaintiff’s dream of success in Las Vegas and her “luck.” The plaintiff asserted the defendant bargained with her to go to Las Vegas in return for intangibles that the defendant thought the plaintiff offered (good luck and the realization of the dream). The plaintiff said she gave up her right to remain in Houston in return for the agreement to split any winnings. The plaintiff also asserted the agreement was an exchange of promises.

…The plaintiff alleged she promised to share one-half of her winnings with the defendant in exchange for the defendant’s promise to share one-half of her winnings with the plaintiff. These promises, if made, represent the respective benefits and detriments, or the bargained for exchange, necessary to satisfy the consideration requirement. See [Citation] (when no other consideration is shown, mutual obligations by the parties to the agreement will furnish sufficient consideration to constitute a binding contract).…[Regarding the Statute of Frauds argument:] The defendant asserted the agreement, if any, was unenforceable under the statute of frauds because it could not be performed within one year. There is no dispute that the winnings were to be paid over a period of 20 years.…

[The statute] does not apply if the contract, from its terms, could possibly be performed within a year—however improbable performance within one year may be. [Citations] [It bars] only oral contracts that cannot be completed within one year. [Citation] (If the agreement, either by its terms or by the nature of the required acts, cannot be performed within one year, it falls within the statute of frauds and must be in writing).

To determine the applicability of the statute of frauds with indefinite contracts, this Court may use any reasonably clear method of ascertaining the intended length of performance. [Citation] The method is used to determine the parties’ intentions at the time of contracting. The fact that the entire performance within one year is not required, or expected, will not bring an agreement within the statute. See [Citations].

Assuming without deciding that the parties agreed to share their gambling winnings, such an agreement possibly could have been performed within one year. For example, if the plaintiff and defendant had won $200, they probably would have received all the money in one pay-out and could have split the winnings immediately. Therefore, the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment based on her affirmative defense of the statute of frauds.

We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Case questions

  1. The defendant contended there was no consideration to support her alleged promise to split the winnings fifty-fifty. What consideration did the court find here?
  2. The defendant contended that the Statute of Frauds’ one-year rule prohibited the plaintiff from attempting to prove the existence of the alleged oral contract to split the winnings. What reasoning did the court give here as to why the statute did not apply?
  3. After this case, the court remanded the matter to the lower court. What has to happen there before plaintiff gets her money?

 

Activity 11A

Debate: The Contract for Life

Generally, the employment relationship between an employer and an employee is considered to be “at will.” This means that the relationship can be ended at any time, by either the employer or the employee. Thus, only a minority of employees work under employment contracts which set out a length of time for the relationship in the contract. Even fewer such employment contracts set out no specific end date, becoming what might be a contract for the life of the employee. In most states and in the federal government, judges have the promise of lifetime employment, commonly known as tenure. And speaking of tenure, this is a common practice in higher education, too.

We learned that the one-year rule requires that contracts which cannot be completed within a year must be written. On the other hand, a contract that has the possibility of being completed within a year can be oral. Regarding tenure, this might become a very long contract, and yet because the employee whose life it is based on could die within a year, it doesn’t have to be written. Or does it?

Question: Regarding the one-year rule, what are the reasons why a contract for tenure should be required to be written?

Question: Using the same one-year rule, what are the reasons why a contract for tenure should be enforceable even it is not written?

Question: If you were a lawmaker considering a change to a Statute of Frauds dealing specifically with the issue of lifetime employment contracts, what would you want the statute to require?

Question: Does New Jersey have a one-year rule requiring contracts in excess of a year long to be written?

Contracts in Consideration of Marriage

An agreement that relies on the promise to marry as consideration for some other promise must be written under the Statute of Frauds. For instance, if Carter proposes marriage to Max, and Max agrees to marry Carter as long as Carter also gives Max a car, this agreement must be written. Mutual promises to marry, however are not within the rule. For instance, if Carter proposes marriage to Max, and Max agrees to marry Carter, there is no promise that is part of the marriage proposal. Therefore, this marriage proposal agreement need not be written.

In addition, the Statute of Frauds governs such promises where marriage is the consideration regardless of who makes the promise. Suppose Carter’s father had said to Carter, “If you marry Max and settle down, I will give you $1 million.” The father’s promise to Carter is not enforceable unless written.

A common application of this area of the Statute of Frauds is used for prenuptial agreements. These are agreements that some people use prior to entering a marriage so that they can establish ownership rights in their own property and limit the ownership rights of the future spouse. Such agreements would be effective once the marriage takes place and could stipulate how assets will be treated upon divorce or death. This Statute of Frauds would also apply to postnuptial agreements where the consideration would be agreeing to continue with the marriage.

There are no specific exceptions for these types of agreements, but they are limited in application to people who use marriage as consideration and then get married. People who cohabitate are not covered by this area of the Statute of Frauds, although other areas might apply in those situations. It is also important that when a prenuptial agreement is used, the voluntariness of the agreement is clear so that any future court reviewing the agreement would not be concerned about enforcing it. If the agreement is unclear, or appears involuntary at the time it is used, a court might decline to enforce it and instead make equitable adjustments of property of the marriage to avoid an injustice.

Promises to Pay the Debt of Another

A promise to pay the debt of another person if that person does not pay their own debt must be written under the Statute of Frauds. Such promises can be called a collateral promise or a secondary promise because the promise is ancillary to some other promise. For example, Alex wants to take out a loan for their first car. Alex has not yet established credit, and so due to their poor credit history, the lender asks for a guarantor who will agree to make the payments if Alex fails to pay. Alex asks their mother to guarantee the debt. The mother’s agreement with the lender is the secondary promise, and must be written in order for the lender to enforce it if Alex defaults in the future. In this scenario, the mother is a surety or guarantor (the terms are essentially synonymous); someone who promises to perform upon the default of another.

This agreement distills down to the following: B agrees to pay C if A does not. B is making an agreement with C that is collateral—on the side—to the promise A is making to C.

This rule only applies to a collateral promise. For example if Alex’s mother agrees to make half of the payments on Alex’s car loan, this would not be a collateral but instead be a primary promise. Thus, under this rule, the Statute of Frauds would not require that the promise be reduced to writing. In other words, where A and B both agree to pay C this is a direct promise, not a collateral promise.

Moreover, under this rule the debt paid for someone else need not be money, but can be any contractual duty. For example, if Alex agrees to work off some car payments at the dealership car wash, Alex’s mother can promise to show up and wash cars if Alex fails to do so. This, too, would be a secondary or collateral promise, and therefore it must be written to be enforceable.

Exception to Promises to Pay the Debt of Another

The main purpose doctrine is a major exception to the surety provision of the Statute of Frauds. Under this doctrine, the reason for agreeing to act as a surety is considered when determining if a written agreement is required. If the main purpose of this agreement was to secure an economic advantage for the surety, then the agreement is not bound by the Statute of Frauds writing requirement. Suppose, in the previous example, that Alex’s mother is really the one who wants the car, but doesn’t want to buy one herself. Instead she agrees to act as surety, knowing all along that she will be the one using the car to get back and forth to work and run daily errands. In such a situation, the agreement to pay Alex’s debt, even when the agreement was oral, would be binding on Alex’s mom since her main purpose in making this agreement was her own transportation needs, and not Alex’s.

Normally, the main purpose rule comes into play when the surety desires a financial advantage to herself that cannot occur unless she provides some security. For example, the board chairman of a small company, who also owns all the voting stock, might guarantee a printer that if his company defaulted in paying the bill for desperately needed catalogs, he would personally pay the bill. If his main purpose in giving the guarantee was to get the catalogues printed in order to stave off bankruptcy, and thus to preserve his own interest in the company, he would be bound by an oral agreement. 

Case 11.2

Wilson Floors Co. v. Sciota Park, Ltd., and Unit, Inc., 377 N.E.2d 514 (1978)

SWEENY, J.

In December of 1971, Wilson Floors Company (hereinafter “Wilson”) entered into a contract with Unit, Inc. (hereinafter “Unit”), a Texas corporation to furnish and install flooring materials for “The Cliffs” project, a development consisting of new apartments and an office building to be located in Columbus, Ohio. Unit…was the general manager for the project. The Pittsburgh National Bank (hereinafter the bank), as the construction lender for the project, held mortgages on The Cliffs property security for construction loans which the bank had made to Unit.

As the work progressed on the project Unit fell behind in making payments to Wilson for its completed work in the spring of 1973. At that time, the project was approximately two-thirds completed, the first mortgage money of seven million dollars having been fully dispersed by the bank to Unit. Appellant [Wilson] thereupon stopped work in May of 1973 and informed Unit that it would not continue until payments were forthcoming. On May 15, 1973, the bank conducted a meeting with the subcontractors in The Cliffs project, including Wilson.

At the meeting, the bank sought to determine whether it would be beneficial at that stage of the project to lend more money to Unit, foreclose on the mortgage and hire a new contractor to complete the work, or do nothing. Subcontractors were requested to furnish the bank an itemized account of what Unit owed them, and a cost estimate of future services necessary to complete their job contracts. Having reviewed the alternatives, the bank determined that it would be in its best interest to provide additional financing for the project. The bank reasoned that to foreclose on the mortgage and hire a new contractor at this stage of construction would result in higher costs.

There is conflicting testimony in regard to whether the bank made assurances to Wilson at this meeting that it would be paid for all work to be rendered on the project. However, after the May meeting, Wilson, along with the other subcontractors, did return to work.

Payments from Unit again were not forthcoming, resulting in a second work stoppage. The bank then arranged another meeting to be conducted on June 28, 1973.

At this second meeting, there is conflicting testimony concerning the import of the statements made by the bank representative to the subcontractors. The bank representative who spoke at the meeting testified at trial that he had merely advised the subcontractors that adequate funds would be available to complete the job. However, two representatives of Wilson, also in attendance at the meeting, testified that the bank representative had assured Wilson that if it returned to work, it would be paid.

After the meeting, Wilson returned to work and continued to submit its progress billings to Unit for payment. Upon completion of its portion of The Cliffs project, Wilson submitted its final invoice of $15,584.50 to Unit. This amount was adjusted downward to $15,443.06 upon agreement of Unit and Wilson. However, Wilson was not paid this amount.

As a result of nonpayment, Wilson filed suit…against Unit and the bank to recover the $15,443.06 [about $111,700 in 2024 dollars]. On September 26, 1975, Wilson and Unit stipulated that judgment for the sum of $15,365.84, plus interest, be entered against Unit. When Unit failed to satisfy the judgment, appellant proceeded with its action against the bank. [The trial court decided in favor of Wilson, but the intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court decision.]…[The Ohio statute of frauds provides]:

No action shall be brought whereby to charge the defendant, upon a special promise, to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person…unless the agreement…or some memorandum thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged.…

In paragraph one of Crawford v. Edison [an 1887 Ohio case], however, this court stated:

When the leading object of the promisor is, not to answer for another, but to subserve some pecuniary or business purpose of his own, involving a benefit to himself…his promise is not within the statute of frauds, although it may be in form a promise to pay the debt of another and its performance may incidentally have the effect of extinguishing that liability.…

So long as the promisor undertakes to pay the subcontractor whatever his services are worth irrespective of what he may owe the general contractor and so long as the main purpose of the promisor is to further his own business or pecuniary interest, the promise is enforceable.…

The facts in the instant case reflect that the bank made its guarantee to Wilson to subserve its own business interest of reducing costs to complete the project. Clearly, the bank induced Wilson to remain on the job and rely on its credit for future payments. To apply the statute of frauds and hold that the bank had no contractual duty to Wilson despite its oral guarantees would not prevent the wrong which the statute’s enactment was to prevent, but would in reality effectuate a wrong.

Therefore, this court affirms the finding of the Court of Common Pleas that the verbal agreement made by the bank is enforceable by Wilson, and reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Case questions

  1. The exception to the Statute of Frauds in issue here is the main purpose doctrine. How does this doctrine relate to the concept of promissory estoppel?
  2. What was the main purpose behind the bank’s purported promise?

Agreements of Executor or Administrator

The promise by an executor or administrator of an estate to answer personally for the debt or other duty of the deceased is analogous to the surety provision—it must be evidenced by some writing if it is to be enforced. For an agreement to be covered by the statute, there must have been an obligation before the decedent’s death. Thus, if the executor arranges for a funeral and guarantees payment should the estate fail to pay the fee, an oral contract is binding, because there was no preexisting obligation. If, however, the decedent has made his own arrangements and signed a note obligating his estate to pay, the executor’s promise to guarantee payment would be binding only if written. The main purpose exception to the surety provision applies to this section of the Statute of Frauds as well.

Video on the Writing Requirement

The Uniform Commercial Code

Contracts for the sale of goods in the amount of $500 or greater must be evidenced by some writing to be enforceable. Section 2-201 of the UCC states:

[A] contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.

Thus, to satisfy the requirement of the UCC, a contract for goods worth $500 or more must have the quantity of goods as well as the signature of the party against whom enforcement is sought. For example, if a buyer contracts with a seller to purchase 10,000 widgets for $1,000, the written contract for sale must include the quantity of widgets – 10,000 – and at least one signature. If the buyer wants to enforce the contract as against the seller, the buyer needs the seller’s signature. Similarly, if the seller seeks to sue buyer for breach of contract, the seller needs the buyer’s signature on the contract.

This UCC Code section has no impact on sales of goods below $500 so oral agreements for the sale of goods valued at less than $500 are fully enforceable without exception.

Exceptions under the UCC

There are four exceptions to the UCC’s Statute of Frauds requirement that are relevant here.

The Ten-Day-Reply Doctrine

The UCC holds merchants to a higher standard of conduct than non-merchants. The ten-day-reply doctrine provides that in a contract between two merchants, if an oral agreement is reached and one party sends the other a written statement confirming it, the other party has ten days to object in writing or the agreement is enforceable. 

“Specially Manufactured Goods”

This UCC provides an exception for a seller that has manufactured goods to the buyer’s specifications or who has made “either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement. Assuming that the goods are unsuitable for sale to others, if the buyer repudiates the oral agreement, the seller will be able to seek remedies even if the agreement for the specially manufactured goods was oral.

The “Admission” Exception

This exception arises when the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in testimony or legal papers that a contract was in fact made.  That said, the admission will not permit enforcement of all claimed terms of the contract; enforcement is limited to the quantity of goods admitted.

The “Payment or Delivery and Acceptance” Exception

Similar to the past performance exception for the sale of interest in land, the UCC provides that an oral contract for goods in excess of $500 will be upheld if payment has already been made and accepted, or if the goods have been received and accepted. 

Other Writing Requirements

In addition to these requirements, the UCC provides that agreements for the sale of securities (e.g., most stocks and bonds) usually need to be evidenced by a writing, and agreements for property not included in the sales or securities articles of the UCC that exceed $5,000 in value need to be so evidenced.  Included here would be intangible property such as rights to royalties and to mortgage payments, and other rights created by contract. And in many states, other statutes require a writing for several different kinds of contracts. These include agreements to pay commissions to real estate brokers, to make a will, to pay debts already discharged in bankruptcy, to arbitrate rather than litigate, to make loans, and to make installment contracts.

Activity 11B

Which is Which

Check your Understanding

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