Chapter 14 – Remedies

Learning Objectives

After studying this chapter, you should be able to:

  1. Explain the reason for contract remedies and how courts decide which remedies are appropriate.
  2. Describe the interests that are protected by contract remedies.
  3. Calculate and apply the types of legal remedies.
  4. Apply the types of equitable remedies.
  5. Discuss the limitations on contract remedies.

14.1 Theory of Contract Remedies

People choose to enter contracts because they genuinely want the benefit of the bargain that they made with the other party. To get that benefit, each promisor will generally perform their end of the deal. Thus, most contracts are discharged by performance, not breached. But, when a valid agreement has been made and the promisor’s duties have not been discharged there is a breach of contract. This Chapter is concerned with the rights of the parties in a situation where there is a breach of contract, when there is a failure of performance, or when the contract has been avoided because of incapacity or misrepresentation or other justifications for voidable contracts.

Contract remedies are intended to make the non-breaching party whole. The two categories of remedies for breach of contract are legal remedies and equitable remedies. Legal remedies are mostly monetary damages, while equitable remedies are focused on ways to make a party whole like specific performance, injunctions, and restitution. Generally, a party to a contract is not forced to perform. Either party has the power (though not the right) to breach. Sometimes it may make more sense to breach a contract when it is economically more advantageous to breach and suffer the consequence than to perform.

To illustrate this, imagine that TechSoft Inc., agrees to create a sophisticated chatbot for another company, BusinessTech Enterprises, for $1 million. As TechSoft gets started working on the project, BusinessTech discovers that a new technology makes it possible to create a more accurate chatbot for $500,000, half the price. Because of this, BusinessTech decides to breach the contract. As long as the penalties for breach are less than $500,000 it makes financial sense to breach the contract. In addition, the breach also allows BusinessTech to use a newer and more accurate technology. TechSoft gets some money in the form of penalties for breach, and BusinessTech gets a cheaper and more advanced technology. A breach, in such a case, is economically and technologically smarter.

The focus of this Chapter is the way in which the law seeks to make the aggrieved party whole when there is a breach of contract.

Purpose of Remedies

The overall purpose of contract remedies is to ensure that contracts are enforced and that parties are held accountable for fulfilling their obligations under a contract. The existence of such remedies helps to promote trust and reliability in business transactions, and can provide a way to resolve disputes that may arise during the course of a business relationship. Contract remedies aim to put the non-breaching party in the position he or she would have been in had there been no breach. The purpose is not to punish the breaching party, but to make the non-breaching party whole.

Contract remedies can be either legal or equitable in nature, and they may include monetary damages, specific performance, or cancellation and restitution. Legal remedies are damages to compensate the non-breaching party for any losses suffered as a result of the breach. Damages are money paid by one party to another due to a breach. These remedies may include compensatory damages, which are intended to put the non-breaching party in the position they would have been in had the contract been fully performed, or consequential damages, which are intended to compensate the non-breaching party for any additional losses that were caused by the breach.

Equitable remedies, on the other hand, are designed to discourage, prevent, or remedy a breach of contract rather than to compensate for losses. One common equitable remedy is specific performance, which requires the breaching party to fulfill their contractual obligations. Another equitable remedy is cancellation and restitution, which allows the non-breaching party to cancel the contract and recover any payments or property that they provided to the breaching party. Finally, an injunction, or judicial order, can direct a party to stop doing something that would violate the contract. Both legal and equitable remedies are explored more fully throughout the Chapter.

Parties Have the Power—but Not the Right—to Breach

In view of the importance given to the intention of the parties in forming and interpreting contracts, it may seem surprising that the remedy for every breach is not a judicial order that the obligor carry out his or her undertakings. But it is not. Some duties cannot be performed after a breach, because time and circumstances will have altered their purpose and rendered many worthless. Some duties have a lesser value after a breach, and so the non-breaching party may no longer be interested in receiving the performance that was originally promised. If a Court were to order a contract be performed, it may require the parties to continue a relationship when neither are interested in or willing to do so.

Even when it would be theoretically possible for courts to order contracting parties to carry out their contracts, this remedy is rare. A party is permitted to breach a contract. As noted in the TechSoft example above, the law of remedies often provides the parties with an incentive to break the contract in order to make a good business decision. If breached, a contract that requires performance without exception will also require a court to manage and oversee that performance to assure it is acceptable under the original terms of a contract. This calls on courts to manage relationships – an admittedly difficult task. For example, take a contract for a construction contract for a large building project. Such a contract would include detailed specifications and timelines that the contractor must adhere to in order to complete the project according to the owner’s expectations. Now imagine that there is a breach of contract and the contractor fails to meet the specified requirements or timelines. If a court orders that the contractor continue to perform, the court can potentially be required to manage and oversee the performance of the contract. As part of the court’s order, there could be regular progress reports, site visits, or other measures to ensure that the project is proceeding as planned and that the contractor is meeting their obligations under the contract. And, it is certainly possible that the non-breaching party will not be satisfied with the performance of the contractor anyway, or be concerned about the quality of the work or other aspects of the deal that caused the breach in the first place. Thus, they would need a vehicle to lodge these complaints with the court. Now, think about this for a moment. Have you ever seen a judge at a construction site checking in to make sure that a contractor is hard at work on contracting duties? There is a reason you’ve never seen this – courts are ill equipped to provide this level of supervision when ordering that contractual duties are completed as opposed to breached. Providing remedies in the form of damages instead simply makes more sense in most breach situations.

For these reasons, the common law looks more toward compensating the promisee for his or her loss than toward compelling the promisor to perform. In short, the promisor has a choice: perform under the original contract or pay a court’s award in the event of breach. In general, the fundamental purpose of contract remedies is to put the non-breaching party in the position it would have been in had there been no breach.

14.2 Promisee’s Interests Protected by Contract

Contract remedies serve to protect three different interests: an expectation interest, a reliance interest, and a restitution interest. A promisee will have at least one of these interests and may have two or all three.

An expectation interest is the benefit for which the promisee bargained; the remedy is to put him in a position as good as that which he would have been in had the contract been performed.

A reliance interest is the loss suffered by relying on the contract and taking actions consistent with the expectation that the other party will abide by it; the remedy is reimbursement that restores the promisee to his position before the contract was made.

A restitution interest is that which restores to the promisee any benefit he conferred on the promisor: the remedy is return or repayment of the benefit conferred by the promise.

Consider a scenario where a landowner repudiates an executory contract with a builder to construct a garage on her property for $100,000. The builder has not yet started the work. When the project was completed, the builder had anticipated a $10,000 profit (in other words, the garage would have cost $90,000 to build). In a lawsuit against the landowner for breach of contract, what remedies can the builder expect to recover? It is unlikely that a court would order that the garage be constructed anyway, so instead the court will look to the builder’s three possible interests. Since the builder has not yet started his work, he has given the owner nothing, and therefore has no restitution interest. Nor has he any reliance interest, since we are assuming that he has not paid out any money for supplies, hired a work crew, or advanced money to subcontractors. But he anticipated a profit, and so he has an expectation interest of $10,000.

Let’s change the scenario to include that the builder had already dug out the foundation and poured concrete, at a cost of $15,000, when the landowner repudiated the contract. His expectation interest has become $25,000 (the difference between $100,000 and $75,000, the money he will save by not having to finish the job). His reliance interest is $15,000, because this is the amount he has already spent. He may also have a restitution interest, depending on how much the foundation of the house is worth to the owner. (The value could be more or less than the sum of money actually expended to produce the foundation; for example, the builder might have had to pay his subcontractors for a greater share of the job than they had completed, and those sums therefore would not be reflected in the worth of the foundation.)

Normally, the promisee will choose which of the three interests to pursue. This is called election of remedies. Election of remedies in contract law refers to the principle that allows a party who has been wronged in a contract to choose among different available legal remedies or courses of action to address the breach. Once a party elects a particular remedy and pursues it, they generally cannot change their mind and pursue a different remedy for the same breach of contract. As is to be expected, the choice hinges on the circumstances of the case, his feelings, and the amount at stake.

Activity 14A

Which is Which

 

14.3 Legal Remedies: Damages

Damages are a common legal remedy used to compensate the non-breaching party for the harm caused by the breach. The aim of awarding damages is to put the injured party in the position they would have been in if the contract had been performed, insofar as money can accomplish this. The promisee, also called the non-breaching party, has the right to damages (a money award) in a breach of contract action if that is required to make her whole, unless the contract itself or other circumstances suspend or discharge that right.  Six types of damages are discussed below.

Compensatory Damages

Compensatory damages are damages paid (i.e. money) to directly compensate the non-breaching party for the value of what was not done or not performed under the contract. Compensatory damages are based on the expectation interest and aim to put the non-breaching party in the position they would have been in if the contract had been performed as promised. In other words, compensatory damages are calculated to cover the actual financial loss suffered by the non-breaching party due to the breach of contract. For example, if you hired someone to paint a room in your house for $500, and that person breached the contract, your damages would be the difference between $500 and the cost of the replacement painter. If the new painter got $750, then damages would be $250. Yet, the calculation is frequently difficult, especially when the performance is a service that is not easily duplicated. If Rembrandt breached a contract to paint your portrait, the loss could not be measured simply by inquiring how much Van Gogh would charge to do the same thing. Nevertheless, in theory, whatever net value would ultimately have been conferred on the non-breaching party is the proper measure of compensatory damages.

Since the non-breaching party usually has obligations under the contract also, a breach by the other party discharges his duty to perform and may result in savings. Or he may have made substitute arrangements and realized at least a partial profit on the substitution (because the substitution cost less). Or, as in the case of the builder, he may have purchased goods intended for the job that can be used elsewhere. In all these situations, the losses avoided—savings, profits, or value of goods—are subtracted from the losses incurred to arrive at the net damages. The non-breaching party may recover his actual losses, not more. Suppose an employer breaches a contract with a prospective employee who was to begin work for a year at a salary of $35,000. The employee quickly finds other, similar work at a salary of $30,000. Aside from whatever he might have had to spend searching for the job (incidental damages), his compensatory damages are limited to $5,000, the difference between what he would have earned and what he is earning.

Lost volume can be a troublesome problem in calculating damages. This problem arises when the non-breaching party, a supplier of goods or services, enters a second contract when the buyer repudiates. The question is whether the second contract is a substituted performance or an additional one. If it is substituted, damages may be little or nothing; if additional, the entire expectation interest may be recovered. For example, an automobile dealer contracts to sell a car in inventory. Shortly before the deal is closed, the buyer calls up and repudiates the contract. The dealer then sells the car to someone else. If the dealer can show that he could have sold an identical car to the second purchaser regardless of what the first purchaser did, then the second sale stands on its own and cannot be used to offset the net profit recoverable from the first purchaser. The factual inquiry in lost volume cases is whether the non-breaching party would have engaged in the second transaction if the breach had never occurred.

Incidental Damages

In addition to compensatory damages, the non-breaching party may recover incidental damages. Incidental loss includes expenditures that the non-breaching party incurs in attempting to minimize the loss that flows from the breach. Incidental damages are the direct and immediate costs incurred as a result of a breach of contract. Examples of incidental damages may include expenses related to finding a replacement for the non-performing party, such as additional shipping costs, storage fees, or travel expenses. To arrange for substitute goods or services, the non-breaching party might have to pay a premium or special fee to locate another supplier or source of work. These premiums or fees are part of the damages calculation.

Consequential Damages

Consequential damages are damages that are not directly caused by the breach, but rather arise as a consequence of the breach. They are typically more remote and indirect than incidental damages. Consequential damages may include lost profits, lost business opportunities, and other economic losses that result from the non-performance of a contract. The key difference between incidental and consequential damages is the degree of proximity between the damage and the breach. Incidental damages are more closely connected to the breach and are therefore easier to quantify, while consequential damages are more remote and may be more difficult to calculate. These are damages incurred by the non-breaching party without action on his part because of the breach. Consequential damages are also sometimes referred to as indirect or special damages.

Consider an example of a business that contracts with a shipping company to deliver goods to its customers. The shipping company fails to deliver the goods to customers on time, and as a result, the business incurs losses. In this scenario, incidental damages might include the cost to the business of storing the goods while waiting for them to be picked up and delivered by the shipping company, or the cost of hiring another shipping company to deliver the goods instead. Consequential damages, on the other hand, might include the lost profits the company suffered as a result of the delayed delivery, or the cost of losing customers who were unhappy with the late delivery and decided to take their business elsewhere. So, incidental damages are the direct costs incurred as a result of the breach, such as storage or shipping fees, while consequential damages are the indirect losses that result from the breach, such as lost profits or lost business opportunities.

Foreseeability is an important factor in determining whether consequential damages are recoverable in a legal case. In general, a party can only recover consequential damages that were foreseeable at the time the contract was entered into. If the consequential damages were not foreseeable at the time of the contract, then they may not be recoverable. For example, if the shipping company in the example above failed to deliver goods on time and, as a result, the business lost a major client, the lost profits from that client might be recoverable if it was foreseeable that the late delivery could lead to the business suffering the loss of the client. On the other hand, if the loss of the major client was not foreseeable at the time of the contract, then the damages associated with this loss would not be recovered as consequential damages. In sum, if the damages were foreseeable, then they may be recoverable, but if they were not foreseeable, then they may not be recoverable.

Case 14.1

EBWS, LLC v. Britly Corp., 928 A.2d 497 (Vt. 2007)

REIBER, C.J.

The Ransom family owns Rock Bottom Farm in Strafford, Vermont, where Earl Ransom owns a dairy herd and operates an organic dairy farm. In 2000, the Ransoms decided to build a creamery on-site to process their milk and formed EBWS, LLC to operate the dairy-processing plant and to market the plant’s products. In July 2000, Earl Ransom, on behalf of EBWS, met with Britly’s president to discuss building the creamery.…In January 2001, EBWS and Britly entered into a contract requiring Britly to construct a creamery building for EBWS in exchange for $160,318.…The creamery was substantially completed by April 15, 2001, and EBWS moved in soon afterward. On June 5, 2001, EBWS notified Britly of alleged defects in construction. [EBWS continued to use the creamery pending the necessity to vacate it for three weeks when repairs were commenced].

On September 12, 2001, EBWS filed suit against Britly for damages resulting from defective design and construction.…

Following a three-day trial, the jury found Britly had breached the contract and its express warranty, and awarded EBWS: (1) $38,020 in direct damages, and (2) $35,711 in consequential damages.…

…The jury’s award to EBWS included compensation for both direct and consequential damages that EBWS claimed it would incur while the facility closed for repairs. Direct damages [i.e., compensatory damages] are for “losses that naturally and usually flow from the breach itself,” and it is not necessary that the parties actually considered these damages. [Citation]. In comparison, special or consequential damages “must pass the tests of causation, certainty and foreseeability, and, in addition, be reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract.”

…The court ruled that EBWS could not recover for lost profits because it was not a going concern at the time the contract was entered into, and profits were too speculative. The court concluded, however, that EBWS could submit evidence of other business losses, including future payment for unused milk and staff wages.…

At trial, Huyffer, the CEO of EBWS, testified that during a repairs closure the creamery would be required to purchase milk from adjacent Rock Bottom Farm, even though it could not process this milk. She admitted that such a requirement was self-imposed as there was no written output contract between EBWS and the farm to buy milk. In addition, Huyffer testified that EBWS would pay its employees during the closure even though EBWS has no written contract to pay its employees when they are not working. The trial court allowed these elements of damages to be submitted to the jury, and the jury awarded EBWS consequential damages for unused milk and staff wages.

On appeal, Britly contends that because there is no contractual or legal obligation for EBWS to purchase milk or pay its employees, these are not foreseeable damages. EBWS counters that it is common knowledge that cows continue to produce milk, even if the processing plant is not working, and thus it is foreseeable that this loss would occur. We conclude that these damages are not the foreseeable result of Britly’s breach of the construction contract and reverse the award.…

[W]e conclude that…it is not reasonable to expect Britly to foresee that its failure to perform under the contract would result in this type of damages. While we are sympathetic to EBWS’s contention that the cows continue to produce milk, even when the plant is closed down, this fact alone is not enough to demonstrate that buying and dumping milk is a foreseeable result of Britly’s breach of the construction contract. Here, the milk was produced by a separate and distinct entity, Rock Bottom Farm, which sold the milk to EBWS.…

Similarly, EBWS maintained no employment agreements with its employees obligating it to pay wages during periods of closure for repairs, dips in market demand, or for any other reason. Any losses EBWS might suffer in the future because it chooses to pay its employees during a plant closure for repairs would be a voluntary expense and not in Britly’s contemplation at the time it entered the construction contract. It is not reasonable to expect Britly to foresee losses incurred as a result of agreements that are informal in nature and carry no legal obligation on EBWS to perform. “[P]arties are not presumed to know the condition of each other’s affairs nor to take into account contracts with a third party that is not communicated.” [Citation] While it is true that EBWS may have business reasons to pay its employees even without a contractual obligation, for example, to ensure employee loyalty, no evidence was introduced at trial by EBWS to support a sound rationale for such considerations. Under these circumstances, this business decision is beyond the scope of what Britly could have reasonably foreseen as damages for its breach of contract.…

In addition, the actual costs of the wages and milk are uncertain.…[T]he the milk and wages here are future expenses, for which no legal obligation was assumed by EBWS, and which are separate from the terms of the parties’ contract. We note that at the time of the construction contract EBWS had not yet begun to operate as a creamery and had no history of buying milk or paying employees. See [Citation] (explaining that profits for a new business are uncertain and speculative and not recoverable). Thus, both the cost of the milk and the number and amount of wages of future employees that EBWS might pay in the event of a plant closure for repairs are uncertain.

Award for consequential damages is reversed.…

Case questions

  1. Why, according to EBWS’s CEO, would EBWS be required to purchase milk from adjacent Rock Bottom Farm, even though it could not process this milk?
  2. Surely it is well known in Vermont dairy country that dairy farmers can’t simply stop milking cows when no processing plant is available to take the milk—the cows will soon stop producing. Why was EBWS then not entitled to those damages which it will certainly suffer when the creamery is down for repairs?
  3. Britly (the contractor) must have known EBWS had employees that would be idled when the creamery shut down for repairs. Why was it not liable for their lost wages?
  4. What could EBWS have done at the time of contracting to protect itself against the damages it would incur in the event the creamery suffered downtime due to faulty construction?

Nominal Damages

Nominal damages are symbolic in nature and are awarded when a contract has been technically breached, but no actual loss has been suffered by the non-breaching party. These damages are typically a small amount, such as $1, and serve as recognition that a breach occurred even though it did not result in significant harm. In a case where there has been a breach of contract, courts can award nominal damages when the losses associated with the damages are trivial or when losses associated with the damages are speculative and cannot be proven.

In the shipping contract situation above, if the delay in the delivery of the shipped goods did not result in any quantifiable loss to the business, a court may award nominal damages. This would be a very small symbolic amount that would reflect that the business was wronged by the shipping company’s breach of their contract. Nominal damages might also be awarded if the business is unable to provide evidence of the exact amount of damages it suffered as a result of the delayed delivery of the goods by the shipping company. The court may find that the damages suffered by the company are speculative and therefore uncertain. Damages are speculative when it is difficult to quantify the exact financial harm suffered by the non-breaching party, or when it is unclear whether the damages claimed can be directly attributed to the breach of contract. So, the court might award nominal damages to reflect that the business was wronged but could not prove precisely how it incurred damages.

Liquidated Damages

Liquidated damages refer to a predetermined amount of money that a party agrees to pay in the event of a breach of contract. This amount is typically agreed upon and specified in the contract at the time the contract is formed. Liquidated damages are often used in contracts where it may be difficult to calculate the actual damages that would result from a breach of contract. Liquidated damages may also be used in situations where it makes more sense to designate an amount of damages in advance of a breach, as a way to minimize disputes over damages and potential litigation between contracting parties. It’s important to note that the liquidated damages clause must be reasonable and proportional to the harm that may result from a breach, or it may be deemed unenforceable by a court. Liquidated damages cannot be used to punish a party for breaching by requiring the payment of damages far in excess of what the law would otherwise allow. In our shipping company example, the contract could specify that the shipping company must pay the business $100 for every day beyond the agreed-upon delivery date that the goods remain undelivered. That means if the goods are delivered three days late, the shipping company would have to pay the company $300 in liquidated damages. If you have a cell phone contract, you likely have a liquidated damages clause in that contract, which you might be calling an ‘early termination fee.’ Courts will enforce a liquidated damages provision as long as the actual amount of damages is difficult to ascertain and the sum is reasonable in light of the expected or actual harm. If the liquidated sum is unreasonably large, the excess is termed a penalty and is said to be against public policy and unenforceable.

Case 14.2

Watson v. Ingram, 881 P.2d 247 (Wash. 1994)

JOHNSON, J.

…In the summer of 1990, Wayne Watson offered to buy James Ingram’s Bellingham home for $355,000, with a $15,000 [about $36,500 in 2024 dollars] earnest money deposit.…

Under the agreement, the entire amount of the purchase price was due in cash on or before December 3, 1990.…The agreement required Watson to pay a $15,000 earnest money deposit into escrow at Kelstrup Realty, and provided that “[i]n the event of default by Buyer, earnest money shall be forfeited to Seller as liquidated damages, unless Seller elects to seek actual damages or specific performance. Lastly, the agreement contained a provision entitled “BUYER’S REPRESENTATIONS,” which stated, “Buyer represents that buyer has sufficient funds available to close this sale in accordance with this agreement, and is not relying on any contingent source of funds unless otherwise set forth in this agreement”.…

On November 10, 1990, Watson sent a written proposal to Ingram seeking to modify the original agreement. The proposed modification would have allowed Watson to defer paying $54,000 of the $355,000 sale price for between 6 and 12 months after the scheduled December closing date. In exchange, Ingram would receive a second lien position on certain real estate Watson owned.

According to Ingram, the November 10 proposal was the first time he realized Watson did not have financing readily available for the purchase of the house. Ingram notified Watson on November 12, 1990, that he would not agree to modify the original agreement and intended to strictly enforce its terms. Ingram was involved in a child custody suit in California and wanted to move to that state as soon as possible.…[Further efforts by Ingram to sell to third parties and by Watson to get an extension from Ingram failed.]

In September 1991, Ingram finally sold the house to a third party for $355,000, the same price that Watson had agreed to pay in December 1990.

Ingram and Watson each sought to recover Watson’s $15,000 earnest money held in escrow. On December 4, 1990, Ingram wrote to Kelstrup Realty, indicating he was entitled to the $15,000 earnest money in escrow because Watson had defaulted. In January 1991, Watson filed this action to recover the earnest money, alleging it amounted to a penalty and Ingram had suffered no actual damages.…

The trial court found the earnest money “was clearly intended by both parties to be non-refundable” if Watson defaulted and determined $15,000 was “a reasonable forecast by [Ingram and Watson] of damages that would be incurred by [Ingram] if [Watson] failed to complete the purchase”. The court entered judgment in favor of Ingram for the amount of the earnest money plus interest. The court also awarded Ingram his attorney fees pursuant to the parties’ agreement. The Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed. Watson now appeals to this court.

This case presents a single issue for review: whether the parties’ contract provision requiring Watson to forfeit a $15,000 nonrefundable earnest money deposit is enforceable as liquidated damages. Liquidated damages clauses are favored in Washington, and courts will uphold them if the sums involved do not amount to a penalty or are otherwise unlawful. [Citation] To determine whether liquidated damages clauses are enforceable, Washington courts have applied a 2-part test from the Restatement of Contracts.…Liquidated damages clauses are upheld if the following two factors are satisfied:

First, the amount fixed must be a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach. Second, the harm must be such that it is incapable or very difficult of ascertainment.

The question before this court is whether this test is to be applied as of the time of contract formation (prospectively) or as of the time of trial (retrospectively). We have previously held, the “[r]easonableness of the forecast will be judged as of the time the contract was entered”. [Citations]

In contrast, a prior Division One opinion relied upon by Petitioner held the reasonableness of the estimate of damages and the difficulty of ascertainment of harm should be measured as of the time of trial, and earnest money agreements should not be enforceable as liquidated damages if the non-breaching party does not suffer actual damage. [Citations]

We…adopt the date of contract formation as the proper timeframe for evaluating the Restatement test. The prospective approach concentrates on whether the liquidated sum represents a reasonable prediction of the harm to the seller if the buyer breaches the agreement, and ignores actual damages except as evidence of the reasonableness of the estimate of potential damage.

We believe this approach better fulfills the underlying purposes of liquidated damages clauses and gives greater weight to the parties’ expectations. Liquidated damages permit parties to allocate business and litigation risks. Even if the estimates of damages are not exact, parties can allocate and quantify those risks and can negotiate adjustments to the contract price in light of the allocated risks. Under the prospective approach, courts will enforce the parties’ allocation of risk so long as the forecasts appear reasonable when made. [Citations]

In addition to permitting parties to allocate risks, liquidated damages provisions lend certainty to the parties’ agreements and permit parties to resolve disputes efficiently in the event of a breach. Rather than litigating the amount of actual damages, the non-breaching party must only establish the reasonableness of the agreement. The prospective approach permits parties to rely on their stipulated amounts without having to precisely establish damages at trial. In contrast, if the reasonableness of the amount is judged retrospectively, against the damage actually suffered, the “parties must fully litigate (at great expense and delay) that which they sought not to litigate.” [Citation].

Petitioner argues the prospective approach treats buyers unfairly because it permits sellers to retain earnest money deposits even when the seller suffers no actual damage, and this violates the principle that contract damages should be compensatory only. He further contends that by evaluating parties’ liquidated damages agreements against actual damages established at trial, courts can most effectively determine whether such agreements were reasonable and fair.

We disagree. As this court has previously explained, “[w]e are loath to interfere with the rights of parties to contract as they please between themselves [Citations] It is not the role of the court to enforce contracts so as to produce the most equitable result. The parties themselves know best what motivations and considerations influenced their bargaining, and, while, “[t]he bargain may be an unfortunate one for the delinquent party,…it is not the duty of courts of common law to relieve parties from the consequences of their own improvidence…” [Citations]

The retrospective approach fails to give proper weight to the parties’ negotiations. At the time of contract formation, unpredictable market fluctuations and variations in possible breaches make it nearly impossible for contracting parties to predict “precisely or within a narrow range the amount of damages that would flow from breach.” [Citations]. However, against this backdrop of uncertainty, the negotiated liquidated damages sum represents the parties’ best estimate of the value of the breach and permits the parties to allocate and incorporate these risks in their negotiations. Under the prospective approach, a court will uphold the parties’ agreed upon liquidated sum so long as the amount represents a reasonable attempt to compensate the non-breaching party. On the other hand, if the reasonableness of a liquidated damages provision is evaluated under a retrospective approach, the parties cannot confidently rely on their agreement because the liquidated sum will not be enforced if, at trial, it is not a close approximation of the damage suffered or if no actual damages are proved.…

Having adopted the date of contract formation as the proper timeframe for evaluating the Restatement test, the Restatement’s second requirement loses independent significance. The central inquiry is whether the specified liquidated damages were reasonable at the time of contract formation.…

We also agree with the Court of Appeals that in the context of real estate agreements, a requirement that damages be difficult to prove at trial would undermine the very purposes of the liquidated damage provision: “certainty, assurance that the contract will be performed, and avoidance of litigation”. [Citation] It would “encourage litigation in virtually every case in which the sale did not close, regardless of whether the earnest money deposit was a reasonable estimate of the seller’s damages.” [Citation]

In sum, so long as the agreed upon earnest money agreement, viewed prospectively, is a reasonable prediction of potential damage suffered by the seller, the agreement should be enforced “without regard to the retrospective calculation of actual damages or the ease with which they may be proved”. The prospective difficulty of estimating potential damage is a factor to be used in assessing the reasonableness of the earnest money agreement…

The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Case questions

  1. What does the court here mean when it says that liquidated damages clauses allow the parties to “allocate and incorporate the risks [of the transaction] in their negotiations”?
  2. Why is it relevant that the plaintiff Ingram was engaged in a child-custody dispute and wanted to move to California as soon as possible?
  3. What, in plain language, is the issue here?
  4. How does the court’s resolution of the issue seem to the court the better analysis?
  5. Why did the plaintiff get to keep the $15,000 when he really suffered no damages?
  6. Express the controlling rule of law out of this case.

Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are those awarded for the purpose of punishing a defendant in a civil action. These damages are meant to punish the breaching party for their behavior rather than to compensate the injured party. They are proper in cases in which the defendant has acted willfully and maliciously and are thought to deter others from acting similarly. Punitive damages are more common in cases of intentional torts (civil wrongs) rather than breach of contract. Since the purpose of contract law is compensation, not punishment, punitive damages have not traditionally been awarded, with one exception—when the breach of contract is also a tort for which punitive damages may be recovered. Punitive damages typically awarded in tort claims when the tortfeasor’s behavior is malicious or willful (reckless conduct causing physical harm, deliberate defamation of one’s character, a knowingly unlawful taking of someone’s property), and some kinds of contract breach are also tortious. For example, when a creditor holding collateral as security under a contract for a loan sells the collateral to a good-faith purchaser for value even though the debtor was not in default, he has breached the contract and committed the tort of conversion; punitive damages may be awarded, assuming the behavior was willful and not merely mistaken. But in the shipping company example that we’ve used throughout this section, punitive damages would not be available absent some indication of willfully tortious conduct on the part of the shipping company.

Punitive damages are not fixed by law. The judge or jury may award at its discretion whatever sum is believed necessary to redress the wrong or deter like conduct in the future. This means that a richer person may be slapped with much heavier punitive damages than a poorer one in the appropriate case. But the judge in all cases may remit (reduce) some or all of a punitive damage award if he or she considers it excessive.

Activity 14B

Debate

Punitive damages are rarely available in breach of contract actions. Because contract breaches often result due to sound business decisions, contract law focuses on compensatory rather than punitive remedies. But not everyone that enters a contract is a business making a business decision. Sometimes, contracting is personal. Take, for example, a couple planning a wedding reception that contracts with their dream venue. While the original couple has the date and event secured by a contract, a celebrity contacts the venue looking for the same date, but will only book if no other events are held at the venue so as to secure privacy. The celebrity offers to pay well more than the original couple is able to pay. The venue breaches the contract with the original couple. The venue knows it will only pay compensatory damages and will be able to do so easily with the extra income from the celebrity event. The couple, on the other hand, has now been thrust into an incredibly stressful situation as they were counting on having their reception already planned. Now, they have to explore alternatives, inform their guests, re-plan the day to fit the new venue, and perhaps will have their event at a location they do not love. This is not an arm’s length transaction from the vantage point of the couple.

  • Should punitive damages be made available in contract actions more frequently? If so, what legal standards should be applied to the availability of punitive damages.
  • Should the law be more focused on discouraging breach and if so would allowing for punitive damages be a step in the right direction?
  • Are there other reforms that you would recommend aimed at discouraging breach?

14.4 Equitable Remedies

When legal remedies are inadequate to make the non-breaching party whole, or a breach of contract involves unique circumstances that make monetary compensation insufficient, equitable remedies may be available. Equitable remedies are non-monetary remedies that are designed to put the non-breaching party in the position they would have been in if the contract had been performed as promised. Equitable remedies include specific performance, injunctions, and restitution. Specific performance requires the breaching party to fulfill their contractual obligations, while injunctions prevent the breaching party from taking certain actions. Restitution is a remedy that allows the parties to return to the consideration the non-breaching party gave so as to return the parties to the precontract status. Each of these types of equitable remedies are discussed below.

Three types of Equitable Remedies

Specific Performance

Specific performance is an equitable remedy that is available in limited situations when one party to a contract fails to perform their obligations under the contract. It is a court-ordered remedy that requires the breaching party to fulfill their contractual obligations as promised. In other words, specific performance is a remedy that compels the breaching party to do what they promised to do in the contract. For example, Emily signs a contract to sell Charlotte a gold samovar, a Russian antique of great sentimental value because it once belonged to Charlotte’s mother. Emily then repudiates the contract and refuses to transfer gold samovar. In a lawsuit, a court may properly grant Charlotte an order of specific performance against Emily, which means that Charlotte will get the gold samovar instead of legal damages. Specific performance essentially gives the non-breaching party the benefit of their bargain, by requiring the breaching party to fulfill their obligations under the contract.

Specific performance is a very limited remedy: it is only available for breach of contract to sell a unique item, that is, a unique item of personal property (the samovar), or a parcel of real estate (all real estate is unique). But if the item is not unique, so that the non-breaching party can go out and buy another one, then the legal remedy of money damages will solve the problem. Specific performance is not available as a remedy to force a person to perform a service, as this would be involuntary servitude. Courts will generally only order specific performance if the non-breaching party can show that monetary damages are inadequate and that specific performance is necessary to avoid an unjust result.

Injunction

An injunction is the second type of equitable remedy available in contract (it is also available in tort). It is a court order directing a person to stop doing that which she should not do. In the context of contract law, injunctions are often used as an equitable remedy to prevent a breach of contract. For example, if an employer has a valid noncompete contract with an employee, and the employee, in breach of that contract, nevertheless undertakes to compete with his former employer, a court may enjoin (issue an order of injunction), directing the former employee to stop such competition. Or if Seller promises to give Buyer the right of first refusal on a parcel of real estate or a unique work of art, but Seller, in breach of a written promise, offers the thing to a third party, a court may enjoin Seller from selling it to the third party. Injunctions are often used when monetary damages would not be an adequate remedy for a breach of contract. This may be because the harm caused by the breach is ongoing, or because the harm is difficult to quantify in monetary terms. Injunctions can be particularly useful in cases where the harm caused by a breach of contract is irreparable, meaning that it cannot be undone through monetary compensation alone.

It is important to note that injunctions are a discretionary remedy, meaning that a court may choose to grant or deny an injunction based on the particular circumstances of the case. Additionally, injunctions can be temporary or permanent, depending on the circumstances of the case. If a person violates an injunction, which is a court order, he may be held in contempt of court and even wind up in jail.  

Case 14.3

Madison Square Garden Corporation v. Carnera, 52 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. Ct. App. 1931)

CHASE, J.

On January 13, 1931, the plaintiff and defendant by their duly authorized agents entered into the following agreement in writing:

1. Carnera agrees that he will render services as a boxer in his next contest (which contest, hereinafter called the ‘First Contest.’…

9. Carnera shall not, pending the holding of the First Contest, render services as a boxer in any major boxing contest, without the written permission of the Garden in each case had and obtained. A major contest is understood to be one with Sharkey, Baer, Campolo, Godfrey, or like grade heavyweights, or heavyweights who shall have beaten any of the above subsequent to the date hereof. If in any boxing contest engaged in by Carnera prior to the holding of the First Contest, he shall lose the same, the Garden shall at its option, to be exercised by a two weeks’ notice to Carnera in writing, be without further liability under the terms of this agreement to Carnera. Carnera shall not render services during the continuance of the option referred to in paragraph 8 hereof for any person, firm or corporation other than the Garden. Carnera shall, however, at all times be permitted to engage in sparring exhibitions in which no decision is rendered and in which the heavy weight championship title is not at stake, and in which Carnera boxes not more than four rounds with any one opponent.’…

Thereafter the defendant, without the permission of the plaintiff, written or otherwise, made a contract to engage in a boxing contest with the Sharkey mentioned in paragraph 9 of the agreement above quoted, and by the terms thereof the contest was to take place before the first contest mentioned in the defendant’s contract with the plaintiff was to be held.

The plaintiff then brought this suit to restrain the defendant from carrying out his contract to box Sharkey, and obtained the preliminary injunction order, from which this appeal was taken. Jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and the required amount is involved.

The District Court has found on affidavits which adequately show it that the defendant’s services are unique and extraordinary. A negative covenant in a contract for such personal services is enforceable by injunction where the damages for a breach are incapable of ascertainment. [Citations]

The defendant points to what is claimed to be lack of consideration for his negative promise, in that the contract is inequitable and contains no agreement to employ him. It is true that there is no promise in so many words to employ the defendant to box in a contest with Stribling or Schmeling, but the agreement read as a whole binds the plaintiff to do just that, provided either Stribling or Schmeling becomes the contestant as the result of the match between them and can be induced to box the defendant. The defendant has agreed to ‘render services as a boxer’ for the plaintiff exclusively, and the plaintiff has agreed to pay him a definite percentage of the gate receipts as his compensation for so doing. The promise to employ the defendant to enable him to earn the compensation agreed upon is implied to the same force and effect as though expressly stated. [Citations] The fact that the plaintiff’s implied promise is conditioned, with respect to the contest with the winner of the Stribling-Schmeling match, upon the consent of that performer, does not show any failure of consideration for the defendant’s promise, [Citation].

As we have seen, the contract is valid and enforceable. It contains a restrictive covenant which may be given effect. Whether a preliminary injunction shall be issued under such circumstances rests in the sound discretion of the court. [Citation] The District Court, in its discretion, did issue the preliminary injunction.…

Order affirmed.

Case questions

  1. Why did the plaintiff not want the defendant to engage in any boxing matches until and except the ones arranged by the plaintiff?
  2. What assertion did the defendant make as to why his promise was not enforceable? Why wasn’t that argument accepted by the court?
  3. If the defendant had refused to engage in a boxing match arranged by the plaintiff, would a court force him to do what he had promised?

Restitution

The third type of equitable remedy is restitution. Restitution is a remedy applicable to several different types of cases: those in which the contract was avoided because of incapacity or misrepresentation, those in which the other party breached, and those in which the party seeking restitution breached. As the word implies, restitution is a restoring to one party of what he gave to the other. Therefore, only to the extent that the injured party conferred a benefit on the other party may the injured party be awarded restitution. The point is, a person who breaches a contract should not suffer a punishment, and the non-breaching party should not be unjustly enriched.

Total Nonperformance by Breaching Party

The non-breaching party is always entitled to restitution in the event of total breach by nonperformance or repudiation, unless both parties have performed all duties except for payment by the other party of a definite sum of money for the injured party’s performance.  For example, Calhoun, a contractor, agrees to build $3,000 worth of fences for only $2,000 and completes the construction. Arlene, the landowner, refuses to pay. Calhoun’s only right is to get the $2,000; he does not have a restitution right to $2,500, the market price of his services (or $3,000, the amount by which her property increased in value); he is entitled, instead, only to $2,000, his contract price. Had Arlene repudiated prior to completion, however, Calhoun would then have been entitled to restitution based either on the market price of the work or on the amount by which he enhanced her property. If the one-party breaches, the non-breaching party is generally entitled to restitution of property that can be returned. Suppose Arlene gives Calhoun a valuable Ming vase in return for his promise to construct the fences. Upon Calhoun’s breach, Arlene is entitled to specific restitution of the vase.

Measuring restitution interest can be problematic. The courts have considerable discretion to award either what it would have cost to hire someone else to do the work that the non-breaching party performed (generally, the market price of the service) or the value that was added to the property of the party in breach by virtue of the claimant’s performance. Calhoun, the contractor, agrees to construct ten fences around Arlene’s acreage at the market price of $25,000. After erecting three, Calhoun has performed services that would cost $7,500, market value. Assume that he has increased the value of Arlene’s grounds by $8,000. If Arlene repudiated, there are two measures of Calhoun’s restitution interest: $8,000, the value by which the property was enhanced, or $7,500, the amount it would have cost Arlene to hire someone else to do the work. Which measure to use depends on who repudiated the contract and for what reason. In some cases, the enhancement of property or wealth measurement could lead to an award vastly exceeding the market price for the service. In such cases, the smaller measure is used. For a doctor performing lifesaving operations on a patient, restitution would recover only the market value of the doctor’s services—not the monetary value of the patient’s life.

Part Performance and Then Breach

A party who has substantially performed and then breached is entitled to restitution of a benefit conferred on the injured party, if the injured party has refused (even though justifiably) to complete his own performance owing to the other’s breach. Since the party in breach is liable to the injured party for damages for loss, this rule comes into play only when the benefit conferred is greater than the amount the non-breaching party has lost. Arlene agrees to sell her property to Calhoun for $120,000, and Calhoun makes a partial payment of $30,000. He then repudiates. Arlene turns around and sells the property to a third party for $110,000. Calhoun—the breaching party—can get his money back, less the damages Arlene suffered as a result of his breach. He gets $30,000 minus the $10,000 loss Arlene incurred. He gets $20,000 in restitution. Otherwise Arlene would be enriched by Calhoun’s breach: she’d get $140,000 in total for real estate worth $120,000. But if he gets $20,000 of his $30,000 back, she receives $110,000 from the third party and $10,000 from Calhoun, so she gets $120,000 total (plus, we hope, incidental damages, at least).

Restitution in Other Cases

Upon repudiation of an oral contract governed by the Statute of Frauds, the non-breaching party is not entitled to her expectation interest, but she may recover in restitution unless the purpose of the statute would be frustrated. When one party avoids a contract owing to lack of capacity, mistake, misrepresentation, duress, or the like, she is entitled to restitution for benefit conferred on the other party. Restitution is also available if a contract duty is discharged or never arises because (1) performance was impracticable, (2) the purpose of the contract was frustrated, (3) a condition did not occur, or (4) a beneficiary disclaimed his benefit.

Activity 14C

Which is which?

14.5 Limitations on Contract Remedies

We have observed that the purpose of remedies in contract law is, where possible, to put the non-breaching party in as good a position as he would have been in had there been no breach. There are, however, several limitations or restrictions affecting when a person can claim remedies, in both law (damages) and equity. Of course the contract itself may—if not unconscionable—limit remedies. Beyond that, the non-breaching party must be able to articulate with some degree of certainty what her damages are; the damages must be foreseeable; the non-breaching party must have made a reasonable effort to mitigate the damages; she must sometime elect to go with one remedy and forgo another; she cannot seek to avoid a contract if she has lost the power to do so. We turn to these points.

Foreseeability

If the damages that flow from a breach of contract lack foreseeability, they will not be recoverable. Failures to act, like acts themselves, have consequences. As the old fable has it, “For want of a nail, the kingdom was lost.” To put a non-breaching party in the position he would have been in had the contract been carried out could mean, in some cases, providing compensation for a long chain of events. In many cases, that would be unjust, because a person who does not anticipate a particular event when making a contract will not normally take steps to protect himself (either through limiting language in the contract or through insurance). The law is not so rigid; a loss is not compensable to the non-breaching party unless the breaching party, at the time the contract was made, understood the loss was foreseeable as a probable result of his breach.

Of course, the loss of the contractual benefit in the event of breach is always foreseeable. A company that signs an employment contract with a prospective employee knows full well that if it breaches, the employee will have a legitimate claim to lost salary. But it likely would have no reason to know that the employee’s holding the job for a certain length of time was a condition of his grandfather’s gift of $1 million.

The leading case, perhaps the most studied case, in all the common law is Hadley v. Baxendale, decided in England in 1854. Joseph and Jonah Hadley were proprietors of a flour mill in Gloucester. In May 1853, the shaft of the milling engine broke, stopping all milling. An employee went to Pickford and Company, a common carrier, and asked that the shaft be sent as quickly as possible to a Greenwich foundry that would use the shaft as a model to construct a new one. The carrier’s agent promised delivery within two days. But through an error, the shaft was shipped by canal rather than by rail and did not arrive in Greenwich for seven days. The Hadleys sued Joseph Baxendale, managing director of Pickford, for the profits they lost because of the delay. In ordering a new trial, the Court of Exchequer ruled that Baxendale was not liable because he had had no notice that the mill was stopped:

Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. 

Thus, when the party in breach did not know and has no reason to know that the contract entailed a special risk of loss, the burden must fall on the non-breaching party. As we have seen, damages attributable to losses that flow from events that do not occur in the ordinary course of events are known as consequential or special damages. The exact amount of a loss need not be foreseeable; it is the nature of the event that distinguishes between claims for ordinary or consequential damages. A repair shop agrees to fix a machine that it knows is intended to be resold. Because it delays, the sale is lost. The repair shop, knowing why timeliness of performance was important, is liable for the lost profit, as long as it was reasonable. It would not be liable for an extraordinary profit that the seller could have made because of circumstances peculiar to the particular sale unless they were disclosed.

The special circumstances need not be recited in the contract. It is enough for the party in breach to have actual knowledge of the loss that would occur through his breach. Moreover, the parol evidence rule does not bar introduction of evidence bearing on the party’s knowledge before the contract was signed. So the lesson to a promisee is that the reason for the terms he bargains for should be explained to the promisor—although too much explanation could kill a contract. A messenger who is paid five dollars to deliver a letter across town is not likely to undertake the mission if he is told in advance that his failure for any reason to deliver the letter will cost the sender $1 million, liability to be placed on the messenger.

Actual knowledge is not the only criterion, because the standard of foreseeability is objective, not subjective. That means that if the party had reason to know—if a reasonable person would have understood—that a particular loss was probable should he breach, then he is liable for damages. What one has reason to know obviously depends on the circumstances of the case, the parties’ prior dealings, and industry custom. A supplier selling to a middleman should know that the commodity will be resold and that delay or default may reduce profits, whereas delay in sale to an end user might not. If it was foreseeable that the breach might cause the non-breaching party to be sued, the other party is liable for legal fees and a resulting judgment or the cost of a settlement.

Even though the breaching party may have knowledge, the courts will not always award full consequential damages. In the interests of fairness, they may impose limitations if such an award would be manifestly unfair. Such cases usually crop up when the parties have dealt informally and there is a considerable disproportion between the loss caused and the benefit the non-breaching party had agreed to confer on the party who breached. The messenger may know that a huge sum of money rides on his prompt delivery of a letter across town, but unless he explicitly contracted to bear liability for failure to deliver, it is unlikely that the courts would force him to ante up $1 million when his fee for the service was only five dollars.

Mitigation of Damages

Contract law encourages the non-breaching party to avoid loss wherever possible; this is called mitigation of damages. The concept is a limitation on damages in law. So there can be no recovery if the non-breaching party had an opportunity to avoid or limit losses and failed to take advantage of it. Such an opportunity exists as long as it does not impose, in the Restatement’s words, an “undue risk, burden or humiliation.”  The effort to mitigate need not be successful. As long as the non-breaching party makes a reasonable, good-faith attempt to mitigate his losses, damages are recoverable.

Mitigation crops up in many circumstances. Thus, a non-breaching party who continues to perform after notice that the promisor has breached or will breach may not recover for expenses incurred in continuing to perform. And losses from the use of defective goods delivered in breach of contract are not compensable if the non-breaching party knew before use that they were defective. Often the non-breaching party can make substitute arrangements—find a new job or a new employee, buy substitute goods or sell them to another buyer—and his failure to do so will limit the amount of damages he will recover from the party who breaches. Under the general rule, failure to mitigate when possible permits the promisor to deduct from damages the amount of the loss that the non-breaching party could have avoided. When there is a readily ascertainable market price for goods, damages are equal to the difference between the contract price and the market price.

A substitute transaction is not just any possible arrangement; it must be suitable under the circumstances. Factors to be considered include the similarity, time and place of performance, and whether the difference between the contracted-for and substitute performances can be measured and compensated. A prospective employee who cannot find substitute work within her field need not mitigate by taking a job in a wholly different one. An advertising salesperson whose employment is repudiated need not mitigate by taking a job as a taxi driver. When the only difference between the original and the substitute performances is price, the non-breaching party must mitigate, even if the substitute performer is the original promisor.

The non-breaching party must mitigate in a timely fashion, but each case is different. If it is clear that the promisor has unconditionally repudiated before performance is due, the non-breaching party must begin to mitigate as soon as practicable and should not wait until the day performance is due to look for an alternative.

As long as the non-breaching party makes a reasonable effort to mitigate, the success of that effort is not an issue in assessing damages. If a film producer’s original cameraman breaches the contract, and if the producer had diligently searched for a substitute cameraman, who costs $150 extra per week and it later came to light that the producer could have hired a cameraman for $100, the company is entitled nevertheless to damages based on the higher figure.

Case 14.4

Shirley MacLaine Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, 474 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970)

BURKE, J.

Defendant Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation appeals from a summary judgment granting to plaintiff the recovery of agreed compensation under a written contract for her services as an actress in a motion picture. As will appear, we have concluded that the trial court correctly ruled in plaintiff’s favor and that the judgment should be affirmed.

Plaintiff is well known as an actress.…Under the contract, dated August 6, 1965, plaintiff was to play the female lead in defendant’s contemplated production of a motion picture entitled “Bloomer Girl.” The contract provided that defendant would pay plaintiff a minimum “guaranteed compensation” of $53,571.42 per week for 14 weeks commencing May 23, 1966, for a total of $750,000 [about $7,072,000 in 2024 dollars]. Prior to May 1966 defendant decided not to produce the picture and by a letter dated April 4, 1966, it notified plaintiff of that decision and that it would not “comply with our obligations to you under” the written contract.

By the same letter and with the professed purpose “to avoid any damage to you,” defendant instead offered to employ plaintiff as the leading actress in another film tentatively entitled “Big Country, Big Man” (hereinafter, “Big Country”). The compensation offered was identical, as were 31 of the 34 numbered provisions or articles of the original contract. Unlike “Bloomer Girl,” however, which was to have been a musical production, “Big Country” was a dramatic “western type” movie. “Bloomer Girl” was to have been filmed in California; “Big Country” was to be produced in Australia. Also, certain terms in the proffered contract varied from those of the original. Plaintiff was given one week within which to accept; she did not and the offer lapsed. Plaintiff then commenced this action seeking recovery of the agreed guaranteed compensation.

The complaint sets forth two causes of action. The first is for money due under the contract; the second, based upon the same allegations as the first, is for damages resulting from defendant’s breach of contract. Defendant in its answer admits the existence and validity of the contract, that plaintiff complied with all the conditions, covenants and promises and stood ready to complete the performance, and that defendant breached and “anticipatorily repudiated” the contract. It denies, however, that any money is due to plaintiff either under the contract or as a result of its breach, and pleads as an affirmative defense to both causes of action plaintiff’s allegedly deliberate failure to mitigate damages, asserting that she unreasonably refused to accept its offer of the leading role in “Big Country.”

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment…[T]he motion was granted…for $750,000 plus interest…in plaintiff’s favor. This appeal by defendant followed.…

The general rule is that the measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount of salary agreed upon for the period of service, less the amount which the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned or with reasonable effort might have earned from other employment. [Citation] However, before projected earnings from other employment opportunities not sought or accepted by the discharged employee can be applied in mitigation, the employer must show that the other employment was comparable, or substantially similar, to that of which the employee has been deprived; the employee’s rejection of or failure to seek other available employment of a different or inferior kind may not be resorted to in order to mitigate damages. [Citations]

In the present case defendant has raised no issue of reasonableness of efforts by plaintiff to obtain other employment; the sole issue is whether plaintiff’s refusal of defendant’s substitute offer of “Big Country” may be used in mitigation. Nor, if the “Big Country” offer was of employment different or inferior when compared with the original “Bloomer Girl” employment, is there an issue as to whether or not plaintiff acted reasonably in refusing the substitute offer. Despite defendant’s arguments to the contrary, no case cited or which our research has discovered holds or suggests that reasonableness is an element of a wrongfully discharged employee’s option to reject, or fail to seek, different or inferior employment lest the possible earnings therefrom be charged against him in mitigation of damages.

Applying the foregoing rules to the record in the present case, with all intendments in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment motion—here, defendant—it is clear that the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff’s failure to accept defendant’s tendered substitute employment could not be applied in mitigation of damages because the offer of the “Big Country” lead was of employment both different and inferior, and that no factual dispute was presented on that issue. The mere circumstance that “Bloomer Girl” was to be a musical review calling upon plaintiff’s talents as a dancer as well as an actress, and was to be produced in the City of Los Angeles, whereas “Big Country” was a straight dramatic role in a “Western Type” story taking place in an opal mine in Australia, demonstrates the difference in kind between the two employments; the female lead as a dramatic actress in a western style motion picture can by no stretch of imagination be considered the equivalent of or substantially similar to the lead in a song-and-dance production.

Additionally, the substitute “Big Country” offer proposed to eliminate or impair the director and screenplay approvals accorded to plaintiff under the original “Bloomer Girl” contract, and thus constituted an offer of inferior employment. No expertise or judicial notice is required in order to hold that the deprivation or infringement of an employee’s rights held under an original employment contract converts the available “other employment” relied upon by the employer to mitigate damages, into inferior employment which the employee need not seek or accept. [Citation]

In view of the determination that defendant failed to present any facts showing the existence of a factual issue with respect to its sole defense—plaintiff’s rejection of its substitute employment offer in mitigation of damages—we need not consider plaintiff’s further contention that for various reasons, including the provisions of the original contract set forth in footnote 1, Ante, plaintiff was excused from attempting to mitigate damages.

The judgment is affirmed.

Case questions

  1. Why did Ms. MacLaine refuse to accept the employment opportunity offered by the defendant?
  2. Why did the defendant think it should not be liable for any damages as a result of its admitted breach of the original contract?
  3. Who has the burden of proof on mitigation issues—who has to show that no mitigation occurred?
  4. Express the controlling rule of law out of this case.

Certainty of Damages

A party can recover only that amount of damages in law which can be proved with reasonable certainty. Some damages are more difficult to prove than others – such as lost profits and loss of goodwill. For example, Alf is convinced that next spring the American public will be receptive to polka-dotted belts with his name monogrammed in front. He arranges for a garment factory to produce 300,000 such belts, but the factory, which takes a large deposit from him in advance, misplaces the order and does not produce the belts in time for the selling season. When Alf discovers the failure, he cannot raise more money to go elsewhere, and his project fails. He cannot recover damages for lost profits because that number is entirely speculative; no one can prove how much he would have made, if anything, because no one would be able to say how much he would have sold without a track record. He can, instead, seek restitution of the monies advanced. If he had rented a warehouse to store the belts, he would also be able to recover his reliance interest.

Proof of lost profits is not always difficult: a seller can generally demonstrate the profit he would have made on the sale to the buyer who has breached. It becomes more difficult, as Alf’s case demonstrates, when the seller has breached the contract. A buyer who contracts for but does not receive raw materials, supplies, and inventory cannot show definitively how much he would have netted from the use he planned to make of them. But he is permitted to prove how much money he has made in the past under similar circumstances, and he may proffer financial and market data, surveys, and expert testimony to support his claim. When proof of profits is difficult or impossible, the courts may grant a nonmonetary award, such as specific performance.

Loss of Power of Avoidance

You will recall that there are several circumstances under which a person may avoid a contract: duress, undue influence, misrepresentation (fraudulent, negligent, or innocent), or mistake. But a party may lose the right to avoid, and thus the right to any remedy, in several other ways, as well.

Delay

If a party is the victim of fraud, she must act promptly to rescind at common law, or she will lose that right and her remedy will be limited to damages in tort.

Affirmation

An infant who waits too long to disaffirm (again, delay) will have ratified the contract, as will one who—notwithstanding being the victim of duress, undue influence, mistake, or any other grounds for avoidance—continues to operate under the contract with full knowledge of his right to avoid. Of course the disability that gave rise to the power of avoidance must have passed before affirmation works.

Rights of Third Parties

The intervening rights of third parties may terminate the power to avoid. For example, Michelle, a minor, sells her watch to Betty Buyer. Up to and within a reasonable time after reaching majority, Michelle could avoid—disaffirm—the contract. But if, before that time, Betty sells the watch to a third party, Michelle cannot get it back from the third party. Similarly, Salvador Seller sells his car to Bill Buyer, who pays for it with a bad check. If the check bounces, Salvador can rescind the deal—Bill’s consideration (the money represented by the check) has failed: Salvador could return the check and get his car back. But if, before the check from Bill bounces, Bill in turn sells the car to Pat Purchaser, Salvador cannot avoid the contract. Pat gets to keep the car. There are, however, some exceptions to this rule.

Agreement of the Parties Limiting Remedies

Certainly it is the general rule that parties are free to enter into any kind of a contract they want, so long as it is not illegal or unconscionable. The inclusion into the contract of a liquidated damages clause—mentioned previously—is one means by which the parties may make an agreement affecting damages. But beyond that it is very common for one side to limit its liability, or for one side to agree that it will pursue only limited remedies against the other in case of breach. Such agreed-to limitations on the availability of remedies are generally acceptable provided they are conspicuous, bargained-for, and not unconscionable. In consumer transactions, courts are more likely to find a contracted-for limitation of remedies unconscionable than in commercial transactions, and under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) there are further restrictions on contractual remedy limitations.

For example, Juan buys ten bags of concrete to make a counter and stand for his expensive new barbecue. The bags have this wording in big print: “Attention. Our sole liability in case this product is defective will be to provide you with a like quantity of nondefective material. We will not be liable for any other damages, direct or indirect, express or implied.” Such a limitation on liability is acceptable. If the concrete is defective, the concrete top breaks, and Juan’s new barbecue is damaged, he will get nothing but some new bags of good concrete. He could have shopped around to find somebody who would deliver concrete with no limitation on liability. As it is, his remedies are limited by the agreement he entered into.

Election of Remedies

At Common Law

Another limitation on remedies—at common law—is the concept of election of remedies. The nature of a loss resulting from a contract breach may be such as to entitle one party to a choice among two or more means to redress the grievance, where the choices are mutually exclusive.

At classic common law, a person who was defrauded had an election of remedies: she could, immediately upon discovering the fraud, rescind, or she could retain the item (real estate or personal property) and attempt to remedy the fraudulently defective performance by suing for damages, but not both. Buyer purchases real estate from Seller for $300,000 and shortly discovers that Seller fraudulently misrepresented the availability of water. Buyer spends $60,000 trying to drill wells. Finally he gives up and sues Seller for fraud, seeking $360,000. Traditionally at common law, he would not get it. He should have rescinded upon discovery of the fraud. Now he can only get $60,000 in damages in tort.  The purpose of the election of remedies doctrine is to prevent the victim of fraud from getting a double recovery, but it has come under increasing criticism. Here is one court’s observation: “A host of commentators support elimination of the election of remedies doctrine. A common theme is that the doctrine substitutes labels and formalism for inquiry into whether double recovery results in fact. The rigid doctrine goes to the other extreme, actually resulting in the under compensation of fraud victims and the protection of undeserving wrongdoers.”   

Some states have eliminated the requirement that an aggrieved party make an election of contract remedies, allowing a party to an action to pursue multiple remedies for breach.

Under the UCC

The doctrine of election of remedy has been rejected by the UCC, which means that the remedies are cumulative in nature. According to Section 2-703(1): “Whether the pursuit of one remedy bars another depends entirely on the facts of the individual case.” UCC, Section 2-721, provides that neither demand for rescission of the contract in the case of misrepresentation or fraud, nor the return or rejection of goods, bars a claim for damages or any other remedy permitted under the UCC for nonfraudulent breach.

Activity 14D

You Be the Judge

The TV show “Shark Tank” is popular among students studying business. On this show, budding entrepreneurs pitch their business ideas to a panel of wealthy investors, hoping to secure a deal that could potentially transform their dreams into reality. The negotiations take place on reality TV, but the investments are real, and costly. What happens after the cameras stop rolling?

Consider the following scenario: An entrepreneur successfully secures a verbal agreement with a Shark on the show. The terms of the deal include a significant investment in exchange for a specified percentage of equity in the entrepreneur’s business. Both parties express their intention to move forward with the deal. A little celebration and a handshake occur between Shark and Entreprenuer. However, post-show, the investor backs out, for any number of reasons, during a period of due duligence before handing over the promised investment. Another possible outcome is that the deal closes but is changed from the verbal agreement that is seen on TV.

Does the televised negotiation that is the verbal agreement made on Shark Tank constitute a legally binding contract? If it isn’t a contract, then what is it?

Is an investor’s decision to back out of a deal after the show considered a breach of contract? Why or why not?

Explore potential legal remedies available to the entrepreneur if the investor’s actions are indeed deemed a breach of contract. Are there any circumstances under which an Entrepreneur’s decision to back out of a deal would cause damages for an investor? If so, what types of damages are more likely?

Tort versus Contract

Frequently a contract breach may also amount to tortious conduct. A physician warrants her treatment as perfectly safe but performs the operation negligently, scarring the patient for life. The patient could sue for malpractice (tort) or for breach of warranty (contract). The choice involves at least four considerations:

  • Statute of limitations. Most statutes of limitations prescribe longer periods for contract than for tort actions.
  • Allowable damages. Punitive damages are more often permitted in tort actions, and certain kinds of injuries are compensable in tort but not in contract suits—for example, pain and suffering.
  • Expert testimony. In most cases, the use of experts would be the same in either tort or contract suits, but in certain contract cases, the expert witness could be dispensed with as, for example, in a contract case charging that the physician abandoned the patient.
  • Insurance coverage. Most policies do not cover intentional torts, so a contract theory that avoids the element of willfulness would provide the plaintiff with a surer chance of recovering monetary damages.

Legal versus Extralegal Remedies

A party entitled to a legal remedy is not required to pursue it. Lawsuits are disruptive not merely to the individuals involved in the dispute but also to the ongoing relationships that may have formed around the parties, especially if they are corporations or other business enterprises. Buyers must usually continue to rely on their suppliers, and sellers on their buyers. Not surprisingly, therefore, many businesspeople refuse to file suits even though they could, preferring to settle their disputes privately or even to ignore claims that they might easily press. Indeed, the decision whether or not to sue is not one for the lawyer but for the client, who must analyze a number of pros and cons, many of them not legal ones at all.

End of Chapter Exercises

  1. Owner of an auto repair shop hires Contractor to remodel his shop but does not mention that two days after the scheduled completion date, Owner is to receive five small U.S. Army personnel carrier trucks for service, with a three-week deadline to finish the job and turn the trucks over to the Army. The contract between Owner and Army has a liquidated damages clause calling for $300 a day for every day trucks are not operable after the deadline. Contractor is five days late in finishing the remodel. Can Owner claim the $1,500 as damages against Contractor as a consequence of the latter’s tardy completion of the contract? Explain.
  2. Inventor develops an electronic billiard table that looks like a regular billiard table, but when balls drop into the pocket, various electronic lights and scorekeeping devices activate. Inventor contracted with Contractor to manufacture ten prototypes and paid him $50,000 in advance, on a total owed of $100,000 ($10,000 for each completed table). After the tables were built to accommodate electronic fittings, Inventor repudiated the contract. Contractor broke the ten tables up, salvaged $1,000 of wood for other billiard tables, and used the rest for firewood. The ten intact tables, without electronics, could have been sold for $500 each ($5,000 total). Contractor then sued Inventor for the profit Contractor would have made had Inventor not breached. To what, if anything, is Contractor entitled by way of damages and why?
  3. Calvin, a promising young basketball and baseball player, signed a multiyear contract with a professional basketball team after graduating from college. After playing basketball for one year, he decided he would rather play baseball and breached his contract with the basketball team. What remedy could the team seek?
  4. Theresa leased a one-bedroom apartment from Landlady for one year at $500 per month. After three months, she vacated the apartment. A family of five wanted to rent the apartment, but Landlady refused. Three months later—six months into what would have been Theresa’s term—Landlady managed to rent the apartment to Tenant for $400 per month. How much does Theresa owe, and why?
  5. Plaintiff, a grocery store, contracted with Defendant, a burglar alarm company, for Defendant to send guards to Plaintiff’s premises and to notify the local police if the alarm was activated. The contract had this language: “It is agreed that the Contractor is not an insurer, that the payments here are based solely on the value of the service in the maintenance of the system described, that it is impracticable and extremely difficult to fix the actual damages, if any, which may proximately result from a failure to perform its services, and in case of failure to perform such services and a resulting loss, its liability shall be limited to $500 as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, and this liability shall be exclusive.” A burglary took place and the alarm was activated, but Defendant failed to respond promptly. The burglars left with $330,000. Is the liquidated damages clause—the limitation on Plaintiff’s right to recover—valid?
  6. The decedent, father of the infant Plaintiff, was killed in a train accident. Testimony showed he was a good and reliable man. Through a representative, the decedent’s surviving child, age five, recovered judgment against the railroad (Defendant). Defendant objected to expert testimony that inflation would probably continue at a minimum annual rate of 5 percent for the next thirteen years (until the boy attained his majority), which was used to calculate the loss in support money caused by the father’s death. The calculations, Defendant said, were unreasonably speculative and uncertain, and damages must be proven with reasonable certainty. Is the testimony valid?
  7. Plaintiff produced and directed a movie for Defendant, but contrary to their agreement, Plaintiff was not given screen credit in the edited film (his name was not shown). The film was screened successfully for nearly four years. Plaintiff then sued (1) for damages for loss of valuable publicity or advertising because his screen credits were omitted for the four years and (2) for an injunction against future injuries. The jury awarded Plaintiff $25,000 on the first count. On the second count, the court held Plaintiff should be able to “modify the prints in his personal possession to include his credits.” But Plaintiff appealed, claiming that Defendant still had many unmodified prints in its possession and that showing those films would cause future damages. What remedy is available to Plaintiff?
  8. In 1929 Kerr Steamship Company, Inc. (Plaintiff), delivered to Defendant, the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), a fairly long telegram—in code—to be transmitted to Manila, Philippine Islands, with instructions about loading one of Kerr’s ships. By mistake, the telegraph was mislaid and not delivered. As a result of the failure to transmit it, the cargo was not loaded and the freight was lost in an amount of $6,675.29 [about $120,000 in 2024 dollars], profit that would have been earned if the message had been sent. Plaintiff said that because the telegram was long and because the sender was a ship company, RCA personnel should have known it was important information dealing with shipping and therefore RCA should be liable for the consequential damages flowing from the failure to send it. Is RCA liable?
  9. Defendant offered to buy a house from Plaintiff. She represented, verbally and in writing, that she had $15,000 to $20,000 of equity in another house and would pay this amount to Plaintiff after selling it. She knew, however, that she had no such equity. Relying on these intentionally fraudulent representations, Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s offer to buy, and the parties entered into a land contract. After taking occupancy, Defendant failed to make any of the contract payments. Plaintiff’s investigation then revealed the fraud. Based on the fraud, Plaintiff sought rescission, ejectment, and recovery for five months of lost use of the property and out-of-pocket expenses. Defendant claimed that under the election of remedies doctrine, Plaintiff seller could not both rescind the contract and get damages for its breach. How should the court rule?
  10. Buyers contracted to purchase a house being constructed by Contractor. The contract contained this clause: “Contractor shall pay to the owners or deduct from the total contract price $100.00 per day as liquidated damages for each day after said date that the construction is not completed and accepted by the Owners and Owners shall not arbitrarily withhold acceptance.” Testimony established the rental value of the home at $400–$415 per month. Is the clause enforceable?
  11. Buyer contracts to buy a 1941 four-door Cadillac convertible from Seller for $75,000. Seller, having found a Third Party who will pay $85,000 for the car, refuses to sell to Buyer. What is Buyer’s remedy?
  12. Assume Third Party had paid the $85,000 and Seller was ordered to sell to Buyer. What is Third Party’s remedy?
  13. Professor Smith contracts to teach business law at State University for the academic year. After the first term is over, she quits. Can State University get an order of specific performance or an injunction requiring Professor Smith to return for the second term?
  14. Now suppose that the reason Professor Smith quit work at State University is because she got a better job at Central University, fifteen miles away. Can State University get an injunction prohibiting her from teaching at Central University?
  15. A chef who has never owned her own restaurant sues a contractor who failed to finish building the chef’s first restaurant on time. She presents evidence of the profits made by similar restaurants that have been in business for some time. Is this good evidence of the damages she has suffered by the delay? To what damages is she entitled?
  16. Rebecca, seventeen years and ten months old, buys a party dress for $300. She wears it to the junior prom but determines it doesn’t look good on her. She puts it in her closet and forgets about it until six months later, when she decides to return it to the store. Is she now entitled to the remedy of rescission?

References

Canal, E. (2022, October 12). We fact-checked seven seasons of Shark Tank Deals. here are the results. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilycanal/2016/10/21/about-72-of-deals-that-happen-on-shark-tank-dont-turn-out-as-seen-on-tv/?sh=4cab7f334ed1

Hadley v. Baxendale (1854), 9 Ex. 341, 354, 156 Eng.Rep. 145, 151.

Head & Seemann, Inc. v. Gregg, 311 N.W.2d 667 (Wis. App. 1981).

Merritt v. Craig, 746 A.2d 923 (Md. 2000).

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 350.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 373.

definition

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